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ABSTRACT 
Essays in Mechanism Design 
by 
J ung Sook You 
This thesis addresses problems in the area of mechanism design. In many settings 
in which collective decisions are made, individuals' actual preferences are not publicly 
observable. As a result, individuals should be relied on to reveal this information. 
We are interested in an important application of mechanism design, which is the 
construction of desirable procedures for deciding upon resource allocation or task 
assignment. 
We make two main contributions. First, we propose a new mechanism for allocat-
ing a divisible commodity between a number of buyers efficiently and fairly. Buyers 
are assumed to behave as price-anticipators rather than as price-takers. The proposed 
mechanism is as parsimonious as possible, in the sense that it requires participants to 
report a one-dimensional message (scalar strategy) instead of an entire utility func-
tion, as required by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. We show that this 
11 
mechanism yields efficient allocations in Nash equilibria and moreover, that these 
equilibria are envy-free. Additionally, we present distinct results that this mechanism 
is the only simple scalar strategy mechanism that both implements efficient Nash 
equilibria and satisfies the no envy axiom of fairness. The mechanism's Nash equi-
libria are proven to satisfy the fairness properties of both Ranking and Voluntary 
Participation. 
Our second contribution is to develop optimal VCG mechanisms in order to as-
sign identical economic "bads" (for example, costly tasks) to agents. An optimal VCG 
mechanism minimizes the largest ratio of budget imbalance to efficient surplus over 
all cost profiles. The optimal non-deficit VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic bud-
get balance, yet the non-deficit requirement is incompatible with reasonable welfare 
bounds. If we omit the non-deficit requirement, individual rationality greatly changes 
the behavior of surplus loss and deficit loss. Allowing a slight deficit, the optimal in-
dividually rational VCG mechanism becomes asymptotically budget balanced. Such 
a phenomenon cannot be found in the case of assigning economic "goods." 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms 
This thesis deals with an important application of mechanism design, which is the 
construction of procedures for deciding upon resource allocation or task assignment. 
We denote by N = { 1, · · · , n} the set of agents, and assume that there are at least two 
agents. We focus on the special class of environments in which agents have quasi-linear 
preferences. Each agent i E N has a private monetary valuation on consumption xi· 
There is a monetary transfer ti E R between each agent i and the mechanism. Agent 
i may need to pay some money to the mechanism or the mechanism may subsidize the 
agent. The net utility of each agent i E N has the following quasi-linear preference: 
(1.1) 
1 
2 
The efficient allocation (of resources) is defined to be an allocation x such that: 
x E argmax L ui(xi) 
xEX iEN 
(1.2) 
where X is the set of feasible allocations. A direct revelation mechanism1 is strategy-
proof (dominant strategy incentive compatible) if for every agent, truth telling is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium of the mechanism. 
In social choice environments with quasi-linear preferences and private valuations, 
a group of mechanisms derived from the seminal work of Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) 
and Groves (1973) consists of mechanisms whose allocation rules select the efficient 
and strategy-proof outcome. Green and Laffont (1977, 1979) discovered that any 
direct revelation mechanism satisfying those two properties is a member of Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanisms (VCG mechanisms). Holmstrom (1979) proved that VCG 
mechanisms are unique on restricted domains which are smoothly connected, in par-
ticular convex domains (Suijs (1996) and Carbajal-Ponce (2007) investigated further 
into the uniqueness of VCG mechanisms). 
After collecting reported valuations u from agents, a VCG Mechanism selects 
resource allocation x such that: 
(1.3) 
1 A mechanism is a direct revelation mechanism if the strategy each agent reports is his valuations 
on all possible allocations 
and implements the following payment scheme for each i E N: 
ti ( u) = - L uj ( x j ( u)) + hi ( u_i) 
#i 
where hi(·) is an arbitrary function of u-i· 
Therefore, agent i's net utility for VCG mechanisms is: 
ui(xi(ui,u-i)) + L::uj(xj(ui,u-i))- hi(u-i)· 
#i 
3 
(1.4) 
(1.5) 
Since hi depends only on the messages u_i sent by other agents, agent i tries to 
maximize ui(xi(ui, u_i)) + Lj-:~i Uj(Xj(ui, u_i)) by choosing Ui· This expression has 
a maximum, maxxEX ui(xi) + L#i uj(xj)· Agent i can achieve this maximum by 
reporting his true utility function ui according to expression (1.3). Truth telling is 
a dominant strategy for every agent, and therefore, VCG mechanisms select efficient 
allocation x ( u). 
Despite satisfying strong incentive compatibility and efficiency, VCG mechanisms 
can be too complicated to be of use in some cases (Nisan and Ronen, 2007), and are 
not guaranteed to be budget balanced (Green and Laffont (1979)). These difficulties 
of VCG mechanisms have recently led economists and computer scientists to search 
alternative mechanisms (Johari and Tsitsiklis (2007), Maheswaran and Basar (2006), 
Yang and Hajek (2006a, 2006b)), or to identify particular VCG mechanisms minimiz-
ing budget imbalance (Bailey (1997), Deb, Gosh and Seo (2002), Green et a1.(1976), 
Green and Laffont (1979), Guo and Conitzer (2009), Zhou (2007), Moulin (1986), 
Deb and Seo (1998)). 
As we explain in detail in Chapter 2, when a resource is divisible (for example, 
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electricity in power grid), agents' reporting utility functions to a VCG mechanism 
implies that each agent should submit an infinite number of valuations to describe 
his utility function. Therefore, the communication between every agent and the 
mechanism requires exponential growth of effort which probably causes an extra cost 
to the agent (Rothkopf (2007)). Additionally, computation of the efficient allocation 
and payment is almost intractable (NP-hard) in VCG mechanisms when a resource 
is divisible (Nisan and Ronen, (2007), Rothkopf (2007) ). 
On the other hand, when objects to be allocated are identical and indivisible, 
implementing VCG mechanisms would not cause informational burden on agents. 
However, we still face the fact that every VCG mechanism cannot be budget bal-
anced at all profiles. If a VCG mechanism generates a budget surplus, then it needs 
to be given away to a passive residual claimant in order to preserve the incentive com-
patibility of a VCG mechanism. In case of budget deficit, the residual claimant must 
finance the mechanism using outside monetary source. Interpreting the budget im-
balance of a mechanism as its implementation cost, Chapter 3 focuses on minimizing 
budget imbalance in the original VCG mechanisms. 
1.2 Divisible Commodity Allocation and Scalar 
Strategy Mechanisms 
For the problem of allocating a divisible commodity where the total amount of the 
resource is R > 0, the monetary value of agent i's resource share Xi E [0, R] is 
represented by a utility function, ui, that is strictly increasing, concave, and smooth. 
For the case of a divisible resource, the amount of information each agent should 
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report to a VCG mechanism is infinitely dimensional. As a class of alternative mech-
anisms to complicated VCG mechanisms, scalar strategy mechanisms have received 
intense attention from computer scientists, interested in designing network capacity 
allocation mechanisms. Kelly (1997) and Kelly et al. (1998) have proposed network 
bandwidth allocation algorithms, where participants submit scalar bids, and then the 
algorithms achieve efficiency under price taking behavior. 
Since every agent is required to submit only a one-dimensional message in scalar 
strategy mechanisms, strategy-proofness is no longer achievable incentive compati-
bility. Instead, we are interested in Nash incentive compatibility of scalar strategy 
mechanisms, that is, the scalar strategy mechanism always induces aN ash equilibrium 
in which the resource is allocated efficiently for a given preference profile. Adopting 
Nash incentive compatibility, for the uniform price model in Kelly (1997), the recent 
literature has focused on its efficiency loss under price anticipating behavior (Mah-
eswaran and Basar (2005), Johari and Tsitsiklis (2004) and Hajek and Yang (2004)). 
For multi-price models, Kelly et al. (1998) provided the original idea of a mech-
anism that maximizes total surrogate utilities, and this has inspired the following 
multi-price scalar strategy mechanisms: VCG-like mechanisms by Johari and Tsit-
siklis (2007); g-mechanisms by Maheswaran and Basar (2006) and Yang and Hajek 
(2006a); and VCG-Kelly mechanisms by Yang and Hajek (2006b). These mechanisms 
have been proven to implement efficient Nash equilibria. Among multi-price scalar 
strategy mechanisms, VCG-like mechanisms in Johari and Tsitsiklis (2007) have the 
most general form and thus, we will study VCG-like mechanisms in Chapter 2. 
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1.2.1 VCG-like Mechanisms 
VCG-like mechanisms use one-dimensional message (scalar strategy) spaces and dif-
ferentiated unit prices. They are similar in both spirit and form to the VCG mecha-
nisms except that each individual reports a one-dimensional message, rather than his 
entire utility function. 
A VCG-like mechanism first requires each agent i to report a nonnegative 
real number ()i which selects a surrogate utility function u(·, ()i) from a given single 
parameter family of functions. The set of surrogate utility functions is the same for 
all agents. After the profile of messages () is collected, VCG-like mechanisms choose 
the resource allocation x such that: 
and the payment scheme t designed similarly to VCG mechanisms such that: 
ti(()) = - L u(xi(()), ()i) + hi(()_i) for all i E N 
#i 
(1.6) 
(1.7) 
where hi(·) is an arbitrary function of ()-i· Thus, the net utility of agent i is written 
as: 
ui(x(e)) + L u(xi(e), ei)- hi(e-i)· 
#i 
(1.8) 
According to expression (1.6), VCG-like mechanisms choose the resource allo-
cation to maximize the sum of surrogate functions, while VCG mechanisms try to 
maximize the sum of reported utility functions as written in expression (1.3). By 
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comparing equation (1.4) and equation (1.7), we notice that both payment schemes 
for VCG mechanisms and VCG-like mechanisms are similarly designed, except that 
VCG mechanisms determine one's payment based on others' reported utility func-
tions, whereas VCG-like mechanisms decide one's payment based on surrogate func-
tions (or scalar strategies) chosen by others. 
As VCG-like mechanisms use the similar idea to that of VCG mechanisms, we 
can anticipate that VCG-like mechanisms would achieve some type of incentive com-
patibility and efficiency, but cannot be budget balanced at all profiles. In VCG-like 
mechanisms, agents select their surrogate functions equating their true marginal utili-
ties with marginal price in such a way that the VCG-like mechanisms achieve efficient 
allocations in Nash equilibria. VCG-like mechanisms are indeed shown to be the only 
scalar strategy mechanisms which achieve efficient allocations for a given utility pro-
file under regularity assumptions, but we also show that it is not possible for them 
to be budget balanced at all profiles in Chapter 2. 
1.2.2 Scalar Strategy Mechanisms and No Envy Axiom 
Our investigation into VCG-like mechanisms will reach further to consider fairness 
properties of VCG-like mechanisms. For multi-price mechanisms such as VCG-like 
mechanisms, buyers may dislike price discrimination and thus become more sensi-
tive to fairness issues. No envy (envy-freeness) axiom is a persuasive standard of 
fairness since each participant is maximally satisfied with his resource share and pay-
ment compared to what others receive and pay (Foley (1967), Thomson (2007)). A 
8 
mechanism is envy-free (or a mechanism satisfies no envy) if: 
u·(x·) - t· > u·(x ·) - t · 2 2 2- 2 J J (1.9) 
holds for all pairs in N at equilibrium allocations x and payment t, given a vector of 
utility functions u. 
For the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects, Papai (2003) 
identifies a class of envy-free VCG mechanisms when utilities are superadditive.2 For 
the same problem, Yengin (2008) characterizes a class of VCG mechanisms satisfying 
envy-free and egalitarian-equivalence axioms on restricted domains.:{ 
However, for the problem of allocating a divisible resource, finding the com-
plete set of efficient and envy-free mechanisms in quasi-linear environments poses a 
problem. Moulin (2008) discusses that efficient cost sharing demand mechanisms for 
divisible commodities cannot reach no envy. 
Maskin (1999) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) show that, for preferences 
satisfying monotonic closedness4 , the no envy axiom is satisfied if an allocation rule 
is Nash implementable in addition to satisfying equal treatment of equals. Unfor-
tunately, quasi-linear preferences are not monotonically closed, rendering Maskin's, 
and Fluerbaey and Maniquet's promising results inapplicable. Likewise, Zhang (2005) 
and Feldman et al (2005) have studied a modified version of the no envy axiom, c-
2 Utilities are superadditive if the utility of a set of objects is at least the sum of the utilities of 
any combination of bundles of objects that it contains. 
3 Egalitarian equivalence requires a mechanism to choose those allocations such that each agent 
is indifferent between a common reference and his assigned resource share with payment. 
4 Let X denote an agent's consumption set with typical elements a, b, .... , and R denote the domain 
of admissible preferences over X. We define Monotonic Closedness as follows: vk, k' E R, \Ia, bE X 
such that aPb, 3R~' E R, Vc EX, (i) ak'c =} aR"c, (ii)bRc =} bR"c, and (iii)""' (ai"b). 
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approximate envy-freeness5 , but their results are only applicable to cases of multiple 
resource allocation. Finding a closed form solution to describe the general structure 
of efficient and envy-free mechanisms is a challenging task for the problem of divisible 
resource allocation. 
1.2.3 Simple Envy-Free Mechanism 
Because there is no literature that studies fairness implication of scalar strategy mech-
anisms, the main contribution of Chapter 2 is bringing the focus on fairness to this 
problem arena, and presenting the Simple-Envy-Free mechanism (SEF mechanism) 
and its properties. 
The SEF mechanism is constructed in the following way. Resource allocation is 
determined to be proportional to strategies: xi = :~ R, and the payment scheme ti 
assigned to each i is linear in agent i's strategy ()i: ti = ()i()N\i - S_i where ()N = 
L:iEN ()i > 0, ()N\i = ()N- ()i, and s_i = L:ui e;. Therefore, in Simple Envy-Free 
Mechanism (SEF mechanism}, agent i's net utility from submitting ()i is: 
If we set a surrogate function of a VCG-like mechanism to be u(xi, ()i) = -fJ:R 
and set residual payment scheme properly, we can see that this VCG-like mechanism 
is the SEF mechanism. 
To maximize the net utility, every agent i equates his marginal utility to marginal 
5 c-approximately envy-free is defined as follows: let p(x) = minih ~;~:;~. When p(x) ~ 1, the 
allocation x is known as an envy-free allocation. We call a mechanism c-approximately envy-free if 
for any x, p(x) ~c. 
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pnce. This is written in the first order condition u~(xi) = (0~) 2 for every agent i and 
we can see easily that an equilibrium allocation is efficient. The SEF mechanism not 
only allocates the commodity efficiently, but also fairly in the sense of no-envy. We 
first plug into inequality (1.9) the forms of allocation rule Xi = :~ R and payment 
scheme ti = ()J)N\i - S_i of SEF mechanism. Then, by writing ()i = x;~N and using 
equilibrium condition u~(xi) = 0}, inequality (1.9) is written as: 
u·(x·) - u·(x ·) > (x·- x ·)u'(x·) 22 2J- 2 J22' 
This holds true because of the concavity of utility functions. The SEF mechanism also 
satisfies other desirable fairness axioms such as ranking and voluntary participation. 
1.3 Multiple Tasks Assignment and Asymptotically 
Budget Balanced VCG Mechanisms 
There are mainly two ways to approach the problem of minimizing the budget im-
balance of VCG mechanisms. First, we weaken the incentive criterion from dominant 
strategy and use Bayesian assumptions for the distribution of utility functions. Then, 
we can calculate the expected budget imbalance (Bailey (1997)).6 For the problem of 
provisioning public goods, Deb, Gosh and Seo (2002), Green et al.(1976) and Green 
and Laffont (1979) give the asymptotic behavior of the expected budget imbalance 
under the pivotal mechanism (Vickrey Auction), and Zhou (2007) provides the same 
for the problem of private good exchange. 
6 1n both the public good provision problem and the bilateral trading problem, there exists no 
budget balanced mechanism that is Bayesian-incentive compatible, efficient, and individually rational 
(Laffont and Maskin (1979) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). 
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Second, we can maintain dominant strategy incentive compatibility, so that we 
assume no prior and approach the problem using the worst case analysis. The Op-
erations Research and Computer Science literatures commonly use the worst case 
analysis, and it is often referred to as competitive analysis (e.g., Tennenholtz (2001)). 
The worst case analysis plays a central role in the algorithmic approach to mechanism 
design. Anshelevich et al. (2004), Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), Porter et 
al. (2004), Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) use the worst case analysis to evalu-
ate the competitiveness of Nash equilibrium behavior in congestion problems on a 
network. Chen and Zhang (2005), Johari and Tsitsiklis (2004, 2007), Sanghavi and 
Hajek (2004), Yang and Hajek (2005) adopt the worst case analysis in one-dimensional 
cost sharing problems. Moulin and Shenker (2001) as well as Roughgarden and Sun-
dararajan (2006a, 2006b)) use it to discuss the tradeoff between budget balance and 
allocative efficiency for (group) strategy-proof cost sharing mechanisms. Goldberg 
et al.(2001, 2006) and Aggarwal et al.(2005) as well as Hartline and McGrew (2005) 
design worst case profit maximizing mechanisms. 
As precedents in the economic literature that use the worst case analysis on VCG 
mechanisms, Moulin (1986) as well as Deb and Seo (1998) investigate the pivotal 
mechanism in the worst scenario for a public good provision problem, and Moulin 
and Shenker (2001) do the same for a cost sharing problem. Guo and Conitzer (2009) 
and Moulin (2009, 2010) construct asymptotically budget balanced VCG mechanisms 
in the worst case scenario. 
12 
1.3.1 Indivisible Economic "Bads" and VCG Mechanisms 
In the case of assigning identical economic "bads" (for example, performing a costly 
task and locating waste disposal facilities) we will see in Chapter 3, each agent is 
required to take at most an object. m of the n agents should perform m identical 
tasks together where 1 :::; m :::; n- 1. Each agent i, i E N can perform a task with 
cost ci, which is private information. We denote by c*k the kth lowest cost among 
c1, · · · , Cn· 
Given a cost profile c, efficient cost for performing m tasks is the minimal cost 
T m (c) = L::;=l c*k. VCG mechanisms assign tasks to a subset of m agents whose total 
cost to perform m tasks together is minimal. Agent i's net disutility Vi in a VCG 
mechanism is written as: 
where hi is an arbitrary function. 
A typical example of VCG mechanisms is the pivotal mechanism. We denote by 
vt(c) the net utility of agent i under the pivotal mechanism. Agent i's net utility 
in the pivotal mechanism is simplified as V:P (c) = ci if Ci :::; c*m or V:P (c) = c*m if 
ci ;:::: c*(m+l). If agent i's cost consists of efficient cost, he will pay only his own cost. 
If agent i's cost is greater than mth smallest cost, he will pay the mth smallest cost. 
If we rewrite the function hi(c-i) as hi(c-i) = -Tm-1 (c_i) - r(i; c_i), where 
r(i; c_i) is a redistribution scheme for agent i, the general form of VCG mechanisms 
13 
is given as: 
Our VCG mechanisms ask the residual claimant to first run the pivotal mech-
anism. Then, the residual claimant distributes a suitable rebate to each agent if 
there is a budget surplus, or charges agents of additional tax if there is a deficit. 
With this interpretation, we write the budget imbalance of a VCG mechanism with 
a redistribution scheme r as: 
n n 
~(c, r) = ps(c)- L r(i; c_i) = (n- m)c*m- L r(i; c_i) 
i=l i=l 
where ps( c) is the budget surplus of the pivotal mechanism at cost profile c. 
1.3.2 Efficient Surplus and Optimality 
As we mentioned earlier, the budget imbalance is considered as implementation cost. 
On the other hand, drawing on the concept of opportunity cost, we notice that imple-
menting a VCG mechanism actually saves costs when performing tasks. To perform 
tasks, a VCG mechanism will spend the efficient cost while a random assignment, 
as the primitive benchmark, will spend average cost. The saved cost garnered by 
the VCG mechanism is the difference between the average cost and the efficient cost. 
Thus, we define efficient surplus ( es) as follows: 
es(c) = mL ci- Tm(c). 
n 
iEN 
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The performance of VCG mechanisms can be fairly compared when we compute 
for each mechanism the implementation cost relative to generated efficient surplus as 
implementation gain. We adopt the worst case analysis to measure the performance 
of a VCG mechanism. Unlike the previous literature, however, we differentiate budget 
surplus and budget deficit, by considering their different natures such that the former 
is wasted money and the latter is borrowed money from the outside of the mechanism. 
Thus, we define the worst case budget surplus as the largest ratio of budget surplus 
to efficient surplus, and the worst case budget deficit is defined accordingly. With 
these definitions, we can identify the set of feasible pairs of worst case budget surplus 
and worst case budget deficit. 
The ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus is bounded by A such as: 
A= sup ~(c) 
cERN es(c) 
+ 
and the absolute ratio of budget deficit to efficient surplus is bounded by f-L such as: 
J-L = sup 
cER!j. 
~(c) 
---
es(c)" 
Since we desire to decrease worst case ratios, we can order pairs of a worst case 
surplus and a worst case deficit by a relation of dominance in a two-dimensional space, 
and will eventually find the frontier of the feasible set. These minimal undominated 
pairs on the frontier are called optimal pairs, and a VCG mechanism generating 
an optimal pair is said to be an optimal mechanism. This definition of optimality 
from optimal frontier is more general than the optimality from efficiency loss (the 
largest ratio of absolute budget imbalance to efficient surplus), thus we provide a 
15 
broad framework to analyze VCG mechanisms. 
1.3.3 Optimal Thadeoffs between Surplus and Deficit 
The main point of Chapter 3 is that once we differentiate budget surplus and budget 
deficit, and impose individual rationality as a natural fairness requirement, optimal 
mechanisms for "goods" and the optimal mechanisms for "bads" behave very differ-
ently. The striking asymmetry resides in the asymptotic behavior of the optimal pairs 
of surplus and deficit under individual rationality for the case of "bads". 
For the problem of assigning economic "goods," whether or not we impose indi-
vidual rationality does not change the relationship between budget surplus and budget 
deficit on the optimal frontier. For the case of economic "goods," a mechanism satis-
fies individual rationality if no agent suffers a net loss as a result of participating, i.e., 
Vi 2:: 0 for all i. We can easily check that for the case of economic "goods," unit worst 
case surplus can only be replaced with unit worst case deficit, regardless of individual 
rationality. 
In the case of economic "bads," individual rationality is defined differently. A 
mechanism satisfies individual rationality if participation in the mechanism brings 
each agent a smaller net loss than the loss he would experience in an anarchistic state 
where everyone performs one task on his own, i.e., Vi ::; ci for all i E N. The different 
interpretations of individual rationality for the case of economic "goods" and the case 
of "bads" turn out to affect the behavior of optimal tradeoffs between budget surplus 
and budget deficit. 
The case of assigning a single "bad" has a unique feature that does not exist 
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for the case of multiple "bads." When we compute the optimal pairs of surplus and 
deficit of any individually rational VCG mechanism and the corresponding optimal 
mechanisms, there exist only two optimal individually rational mechanisms. One is 
the pivotal mechanism whose worst case (relative) budget surplus is infinite (A = oo) 
but generates no budget deficit. For the other, its worst case (relative) budget deficit 
is 1 (f.-l = 1) with no budget surplus, and its linear redistribution scheme is r*(c-i) = 
n~ 1 (c-i)*1 for all i E N. On the contrary, for the case of multiple "bads," we can find 
an infinite number of optimal individually rational mechanisms. This result differs 
from the outcome of allocating economic "goods" in that there are always infinitely 
many optimal pairs for any number of economic "goods." 
For the case of multiple "bads," 2 ::; m::; n -1, we find that the optimal frontier 
of any anonymous and individually rational VCG mechanism is given as: 
A* * 
n,m + f-ln,m = 1 
A(n, m) B(n, m) 
where 
(n-1) 
A(n m)- m-1 · 
' - "\""'m-2 (n-2) ' 
L.....tk=O k (n-1) 
B(n, m) = l:m-3 (n-2) + ~ l:n-2 (n-2) · 
k=O k n-m k=m-1 k 
We observe that limn--+oo A(n, m)/ m~ 1 = 1 and limn--+oo P(n, m)/G(n, m) = 1 where 
P(n, m) = !i~::\ and G(n, m) = m(mn~),~n- 2 • If we do not allow any deficit, the 
optimal mechanism converges to the pivotal mechanism (the worst case surplus of 
the pivotal mechanism is m~ 1 ) and its surplus loss diverges inn. On the other hand, 
we can see that for a fixed m, the function P( n, m) is strictly decreasing in n and 
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converges exponentially fast to zero inn. This implies that as more agents participate, 
a very minute amount of deficit can replace unit surplus. By allowing a slight deficit, 
we can almost achieve budget balanced VCG mechanisms. This result of extremely 
asymmetric tradeoffs between optimal surplus and deficit stands in stark contrast to 
the outcome of assigning economic "goods." 
Chapter 2 
Envy-Free and Incentive 
Compatible Division of a 
Commodity 
We will investigate the problem of allocating a perfectly divisible object between a 
finite number of buyers. Examples of divisible commodity allocation can be found in 
auctions of Treasury notes (Back and Zender (1993), Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist 
(2005)), the sale of communication network capacity (Kelly et al. (1998)), the design 
of electricity markets (Green and Newbery (1992), Ausubel (2006)) and auctions for 
spectrum licenses (Levin (1966)). Auctioning pollution permits (Cramton and Kerr 
(2002)) can be another interesting case where we can study the problem of allocating 
a divisible commodity. 
We assume that each buyer has quasi-linear preferences and participates in a 
game defined by a mechanism. Each participant submits a one-dimensional bid (also 
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known as a message or a signal) to the mechanism. Once all bids have been collected, 
the mechanism determines both the allocation of a resource and the payment scheme 
for each participant. This mechanism is called a scalar strategy mechanism. Nash 
equilibrium points are considered to be predictors of the behavior of agents. 
Among scalar strategy mechanisms, we are particularly interested in multi-price 
mechanisms, VCG-like mechanisms. The VCG-like mechanisms use one dimensional 
message spaces and differentiated unit prices. They are similar in both spirit and 
form to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (VCG mechanisms, Green and Laffont 
(1979)) except that each individual reports a one-dimensional message, rather than 
his entire utility function. Therefore, the VCG-like mechanisms have an advantage: 
the informational burden is lower in VCG-like mechanisms compared to the size of 
information in VCG mechanisms, since the latter requires agents to report infinite 
dimensional vectors in divisible commodity allocation. 
The basic idea behind VCG-like mechanisms is that each agent selects a surra-
gate utility function from a set of scalar parametrized functions. The mechanisms 
determine resource shares to maximize the sum of surrogate utilities with payment 
rules designed similarly to VCG mechanisms. Agents select their surrogate functions 
equating their true marginal utilities with marginal price in such a way that the 
VCG-like mechanisms achieve efficient allocations in Nash equilibria. 
Our goal is to investigate the fairness and budget balance properties of the VCG-
like mechanisms, and to eventually design a scalar strategy mechanism that will 
achieve allocative efficiency, Nash incentive-compatibility, and no envy fairness. 1 For 
multi-price mechanisms such as VCG-like mechanisms, buyers may dislike price dis-
1The no envy axiom is a central standard of fairness in mechanism design theory (Foley (1967), 
Thomson (2007)). 
20 
crimination and thus become more sensitive to fairness issues. 2 An important issue 
is whether a mechanism's implemented allocation is fair enough to meet every in-
dividual's need for justice. No envy (envy-freeness) axiom is a persuasive standard 
of fairness since each participant is maximally satisfied with his resource share and 
payment compared to what others receive and pay. In addition, for mechanisms that 
are not concerned with maximizing revenue, it is often desirable to keep as small a 
budget imbalance as possible, so that the side payment collected or subsidized by a 
mechanism is perceived as a cost of implementation. 
First, we will provide a characterization of VCG-like mechanisms such that they 
are the only scalar strategy mechanisms which achieve efficient allocations for a given 
utility profile (Theorem 1). This is in contrast to the result of inefficiency of scalar 
strategy mechanisms with a uniform price (Johari (2004), Johari and Tsitsiklis (2004), 
Yang and Hajek (2004)). Uniform price scalar strategy mechanisms fail to implement 
efficient allocations for some utility profiles and therefore, they do not satisfy the 
no envy property.3 In addition, we will discuss both no envy and budget balance of 
VCG-like mechanisms. Example 1 demonstrates that many VCG-like mechanisms 
fail no envy property. Proposition 3 shows that VCG-like mechanisms are never 
budget-balanced. It is well-known that no VCG mechanism results in balanced budget 
(Green and Laffont (1979)), and we will show that VCG-like mechanisms inherit this 
property.4 
In Section 2.3, we will construct a VCG-like mechanism that not only implements 
2In 2000, Amazon engaged in price discrimination but stopped its pricing variations since the 
company received complaints from DVDTalk members (Perloff (2004)). 
3 The Appendix (Proposition 10) shows that no uniform pricing scalar strategy mechanism with 
proportional allocations is efficient or envy-free. 
4VCG mechanisms that are almost budget-balanced have just started to be designed. For exam-
ple, see Moulin (2008, 2009). 
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efficient Nash equilibria, but also satisfies the no envy axiom. Furthermore, this mech-
anism involves simply-formed payment rules and satisfies the Ranking and Voluntary 
Participation properties. We call this mechanism the Simple Envy-Free mechanism 
(SEF mechanism) (Theorem 2, Theorem 3). The SEF mechanism is a VCG-like 
mechanism in which each agent's resource share is proportional to his signal, and the 
payment to each agent is linear in his signal. Proposition 2 shows that no envy prop-
erty is stronger than efficiency in the environment of quasilinear utilities. Using this 
result, we can identify the SEF mechanism without considering efficiency. Therefore, 
we characterize the SEF mechanism as a scalar strategy mechanism with proportional 
shares, no envy, and symmetric marginal price (Proposition 5, Proposition 6). 
Every VCG-like mechanism has at least one efficient Nash equilibrium for every 
utility profile, but it may also have multiple equilibria with inefficient equilibria for 
some utility profiles. These properties are discussed in detail within the concrete 
context of the SEF mechanism (Example 3, Example 4). The SEF mechanism may 
have inefficient equilibria only when every agent except one submits a zero strategy. 
We can eliminate these inefficient equilibria, assuming the Inada condition such that 
there are at least two agents whose marginal utilities at zero shares are infinite.·5 In 
Section 2.3.4, we will discuss what happens to the SEF mechanism if we drop the Inada 
condition. Proposition 7 computes the worst case of relative efficiency of the SEF 
mechanism when agents are required to submit only positive strategies. Proposition 8 
shows that engaging two virtual players in the game guarantees approximate efficiency 
without the Inada condition. 6 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. We will de-
5 This statement holds for all VCG-like mechanisms. 
6 This idea is suggested by Yang and Hajek (2006). 
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scribe the model and VCG mechanisms in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we will in-
troduce VCG-like mechanisms. In Section 2.2.1, we will provide a characterization 
of VCG-like mechanisms as efficient scalar strategy mechanisms. In Section 2.2.2, 
we will discuss the properties of VCG-like mechanisms in terms of both fairness and 
budget balance. We will show that many of them fail the no envy test and all of 
them fail to be budget-balanced. In Section 2.3, we will construct the SEF mecha-
nism and discuss its incentive compatibility, fairness properties, and the size of budget 
imbalance in great detail. The SEF mechanism satisfies other axioms such as Rank-
ing and Voluntary Participation and is both efficient and envy-free. Two different 
characterizations of the SEF mechanism are illustrated in Section 2.3.3. In Section 
2.3.4, we drop the Inada condition which enables VCG-like mechanisms to have only 
efficient equilibria. We suggest two methods that would improve efficiency of the 
SEF mechanism without the condition. In the final section, we qualify the need for 
future research to identify a general class of envy-free VCG-like mechanisms, and to 
construct VCG-like mechanisms with the smallest budget imbalances. All proofs are 
gathered in Appendix 2.5. 
2.1 Model 
We are interested in allocating a fixed amount of a divisible resource to a finite number 
of agents. There is a center that possesses a resource and the total amount of the 
resource is R > 0. Let n ~ 2 be the number of agents, and let the set of agents be 
denoted as N = { 1, · · · , n}. 
Let xi be the resource share of agent i and x = (x1 , • • · , Xn)· A resource allocation 
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x is Jeasible if it belongs to the set X = { x : I:iEN xi ::; R, xi ;:::: 0 for all i E N}. 
When agent i receives his resource share, the monetary value of the share 1s 
represented by a utility function, ui, that is continuous, strictly increasing, concave, 
and continuously differentiable on [0, +oo). Let ui(O) = 0 for each i E N. Denoted 
by U, the set of utility functions satisfies the aforementioned properties. Let u = 
(ul, · · · , Un) and U E Un. 
The center tries to maximize the sum of agents' utilities (economic surplus) 
through the allocation of a resource. When a resource allocation determined by 
the center maximizes the economic surplus, the allocation is efficient. 
Efficiency: If given u E un' a resource allocation X is chosen to be 
then the resource allocation x is said to be efficient. 
In addition to an allocatable resource, there can be a money transfer (side pay-
ment) between agents and the center. A transfer of money from agent ito the center 
is denoted by ti E R. ti > 0 means that agent i pays lti I amount of money to the 
center. Likewise, ti < 0 means that the center subsidizes agent i by granting lti I 
amount of money to him. A vector of transfers is denoted by t = (t1, · · · , tn)· 
We will focus on the special environments in which agents have quasilinear pref-
erences. Agent i's net utility function Pi takes the quasilinear form 
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For all i E N, agent i's resource share, xi, and money transfer, ti, are decided 
by the center. Once the center knows the utility functions for all agents, it tries to 
achieve its main goal, "efficiency" for given u E Un. 
However, utility functions u E un of agents are mostly unknown to the center. To 
achieve desired outcomes, the center has to set up a message process (a mechanism) 
through which relevant information is collected. Let 8i denote the set of messages 
that agent i can send to the center. Each agent i E N selects am-dimensional message 
(Ji from ei = {(Jil (Ji E R~}. Let(} be a vector ((Jl, 0 0 0 '(Jn) E e where e = xiEN ei. 
Let e_i = Xj-!iej and (J_i = ((Jl,··· ,(Ji-l,(Ji+l,··· ,en)· 
A mechanism F assigns to each message (} a solution (x, t) = F((J) such that x 
is a vector of feasible allocations and t is a vector of money transfers. If a mech-
anism requires agents to submit m-dimensional messages, the mechanism is called 
m-dimensional strategy mechanism. In addition, if each agent submits his entire 
utility function, i.e., 8i = U for all i E N, a mechanism F is a direct (revelation) 
mechanism. 
Among direct mechanisms, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (VCG mech-
anisms) are proven to be the only mechanisms in which agents report their utility 
functions truthfully in dominant strategy equilibrium7 and allocations are efficient. 
VCG Mechanisms: Given a vector of reported utility functions u E un, VCG 
7The strategy profile()* = (Bi, · · · , ()~) is a dominant strategy equilibrium of mechanism F if, for 
all i E N and all ui E U, 
mechanisms select resource allocation x such that 
and choose payment scheme for each i E N such that 
ti(u) =- L uj(xj(u)) + hi(u-i) 
#i 
where hi(·) is an arbitrary function ofu_i· 
Therefore, agent i's net utility for VCG mechanisms is 
ui(xi(ui, u_i)) + L uj(xj(ui, u_i))- hi(u-i). 
#i 
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(2.1) 
VCG mechanisms are strategy-proof and efficient. 8 Since hi depends only on themes-
sages u_i sent by other agents, agent i tries to maximize ui(xi( ui, u_i) )+ 2::#i uj(xj( ui, u_i)) 
by choosing ui· This expression has a maximum, maxxEX ui(xi) + 2::#i uj(xj)· Agent 
i can achieve this maximum by reporting his true utility function ui according to 
expression (2.1). Truth telling is a dominant strategy for every agent. Therefore, 
VCG mechanisms select efficient allocation x( u). 
A problem with VCG mechanisms is that when a resource is perfectly divisible, 
each individual should report a function which is in infinite dimensional space. In 
8 A direct revelation mechanism F is strategy-proof (or dominant strategy incentive compatible) 
if for all i E N and all ui E U, truth telling is a dominant strategy equilihrium of the mechanism. 
That is, for all i EN, all u E un, and all u~ E U, 
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this case, the informational demand is too high, so the VCG mechanism is very 
difficult to use. Instead, we can consider a mechanism whose informational request is 
quite low, while it still maintains the spirit of the VCG mechanism. In the following 
section, we will introduce scalar strategy mechanisms in which each agent reports a 
one-dimensional message (scalar strategy). 
2.2 VCG-like Scalar Strategy Mechanisms 
A scalar strategy (one-dimensional strategy) mechanism requires each agent i to 
submit a one-dimensional bid ()i such that ()i E [0, +oo). It collects these bids, 
() = (B1 , · · · , Bn) and decides the resource allocation as well as the payment scheme for 
each participant. Therefore, a scalar strategy mechanism consists of a triple (8, x, t) 
where 8 is the set of allowable strategies of the form()= (B1 , · · • , Bn) with ()i E R+, 
i E N, x is the allocation vector, and t is the payment scheme. Each agent i's net 
utility is written as ui(xi(B)) - ti(B). Since agent i's net utility is determined by ()i 
and ()_i, agent i's net utility is denoted by Pi(()i, ()_i) where ()i is his message and ()_i 
is a vector of messages submitted by others. 
Within the class of all scalar strategy mechanisms, this paper discusses VCG-like 
scalar strategy mechanisms (VCG-like mechanisms). 
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2.2.1 Basic Idea and Characterization of VCG-like Mecha-
. 
n1sms 
A VCG-like mechanism imitates VCG mechanisms as follows: first the mechanism 
requires each agent i to report a one-dimensional signal (Ji E [0, oo) which selects a 
surrogate utility function u(·, fJi) from a given single parameter family of functions, 
l1 = { u( ·, Bi) I Bi E [0, oo) }. The set of surrogate utility functions l1 is the same for all 
agents. If (Ji = 0, then u(xi, fJi) = 0. 
We assume that for all i E N, given a positive real number fJi, u(xi, Bi) is strictly 
concave, strictly increasing, continuous and continuously differentiable for xi > 0. In 
addition, for every 'Y E (0, oo) and Xi > 0, there exists a (Ji > 0 such that u'(xi, Bi) = 'Y· 
The last assumption about u implies that all the functions in l1 can cover the 
spaceR!+ whose single element is (xi, "f). Because of this property of u, each agent 
i can express his marginal utility at any amount of resource by selecting (Ji· 
Once the mechanism collects fJ, i.e., u = (u(·, fJ1 ), · · · , u(·, Bn)), it chooses the 
resource allocation x E X that maximizes the sum of surrogate utilities, LiEN u(xi, Bi) 
for the given fJ. The VCG-like mechanism sets its payment scheme analogously to 
the payment scheme of VCG mechanisms, such that each agent's payment depends 
on both the sum of surrogate utilities of other agents (except his surrogate utility) 
and an arbitrary function of strategies submitted by other agents. 
VCG-like Mechanisms: For (} collected, VCG-like mechanisms choose the 
resource allocation x such that 
(2.2) 
and the payment scheme t such that 
ti(e) =- L u(xj(e), ej) + hi(e-i) for all i EN 
#i 
where hi(·) is an arbitrary function of e-i· 
Therefore, agent i's net utility in VCG-like mechanisms is 
ui(xi(B)) + L u(xj(e), ej)- hi(e_i) 
#i 
where hi(·) is an arbitrary function of e-i· 
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As expressed in (2.2), a VCG-like mechanism determines the vector of resource 
shares X for given e, and thus, agent i's resource share Xi, i E N is a function of e. 
Since X = x(B) maximizes L-iEN u(xi, ei), the first order conditions give u'(xi, ei) = 
u'(xj, Bj) for i =/= j, i,j E N, and Bi, Bj > 0. Plugging xi = xi(B) for all i E N 
into the previous expression, we can write agent i's marginal surrogate function as 
u'(xi(B), Bi) = g(B) for all i E N. Therefore, when a VCG-like mechanism provides a 
set of surrogate utility functions z1, the mechanism specifies the function g(B). 
In order to predict the behavior of agents, we will use Nash equilibrium to express 
incentive compatibility. We denote agent i's net utility by Pi(B) to emphasize that 
his resource share xi and payment scheme ti depend on his report ei and reports by 
others e -i. He tries to maximize his net utility by selecting ei based on unilateral 
decision making. We define a Nash equilibrium as follows. 
Nash Equilibrium: e is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for every i E N, 
Pi(Bi, e_i) ?. Pi(B~, e_i) for every B~ E R+· 
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A Nash equilibrium () is an efficient equilibrium if the resource allocation x( ()) 
is efficient. A mechanism is an efficient mechanism if for each u E un, every Nash 
equilibrium is efficient (unfortunately, there is no efficient scalar strategy mechanism 
which implements dominant strategy equilibriumY) 
Now, we will characterize the VCG-like mechanisms in Theorem 1. We show that 
among scalar strategy mechanisms that determine the resource share x according to 
(2.2), VCG-like mechanisms are the only mechanisms in which there exists an efficient 
Nash equilibrium. 10 
Theorem 1. Let a scalar strategy mechanism determine an allocation vector x 
according to (2.2). Assume that for every i E N, the net utility function Pi(()) is 
concave in ()i· Then, the scalar strategy mechanism has an efficient Nash equilibrium 
for each u E un if and only if it is a VCG-like mechanism. 
As Theorem 1 states, VCG-like mechanisms achieve efficient Nash equilibria. We 
can explain the reason in the following way. 
Agent i, i EN chooses his strategy ()ito maximize his net utility ui(xi(())) -ti(()). 
His optimal strategy ()i given () -i is determined by the first order condition: u~ (xi ( ())) · 
8~0~0 ) = 8~J:l. That is, agent i chooses his strategy ()i such that his utility increases 
from a change in his strategy ()i to equal his payment increased from a change in 
his strategy ()i· This first order condition is rewritten as u~(xi) = 8~J:) / 8~0~0). The 
expression in the right hand side is the ratio of the additional amount of money agent 
i has to pay for the additional units of the good agent i receives when he increases 
his strategy ()i· The term 8~J:l j 8~i0~0 ) can be interpreted as marginal price for the 
9This is shown in the Appendix (Proposition 9). 
10Moulin (2008) characterizes cost sharing mechanisms which guarantee the existence of surplus 
maximizing Nash equilibrium demands. 
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divisible good agent i faces at equilibrium. 
VCG-like mechanisms set the same marginal price for all agents such that ati(O) 
80i 
/ 8~0:0) = g(O) where g(O) = u'(xi, Oi) for all i E N. Therefore, agent i selects an 
equilibrium strategy ei satisfying u~(xi) = u'(xi, ei). Notice that efficient allocations 
are essentially determined by marginal utilities in first order conditions such that 
u~(xi) = A for xi > 0 for all i E N. For the efficient allocation x*, each agent i 
chooses 07 satisfying u~(x7) = u'(x7, 07). Using surrogate utility functions and prop-
erly designed payment schemes, VCG-like mechanisms extract the information of true 
marginal utilities at an efficient allocation and therefore achieve efficient equilibria. 
The main goals of a mechanism are typically achieving efficiency, incentive com-
patibility, and fairness. When there are side payments from agents to a mechanism, 
the size of the budget imbalance could present a concern for the center. We will 
discuss the fairness and budget imbalance of VCG-like mechanisms in the following 
subsections. 
2.2.2 Fairness and Budget Balance of VCG-like Mechanisms 
We will mainly consider no envy (envy-freeness) as a central fairness concept in this 
subsection. A mechanism is envy-free, or satisfies no envy, if no agent envies others in 
every equilibrium. Agent i doesn't envy agent j if his own equilibrium allocation of 
resource and payment gives net utility at least as high as his net utility from the case 
in which he receives agent j's share and payment allocation instead. The envy-free 
state of agent i compared against agent j is written as ui(xi) - ti ~ ui(xj) - tj at 
equilibrium allocations. 
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Envy-Freeness (No Envy): If ui(xi)- ti 2:: ui(xj)- tj holds for all pairs inN 
at equilibrium allocations x and payment t, given a vector of utility functions u E un, 
the mechanism is envy-free (or the mechanism satisfies no envy). 
Proposition 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for mechanisms to be 
envy-free in quasilinear environments. 
Proposition 1. An allocation mechanism with side payment is envy-free if and 
only if it satisfies the following no envy condition: Given u E un, at every equi-
librium allocation and payment ( x, t), for every i E N and all j =f. i, if x j =f. xi, 
for Xi > 0 
for xi= 0, 
The no envy condition conveys efficiency. That is, if a mechanism is envy-free, 
then it is efficient. 11 
Proposition 2. An envy-free allocation mechanism with side payment is effi-
cient. 
Remark. The reverse statement is not true. Unless A = ::=:;1 for all i, j E N 
and i =f. j where A is the market clearing price for price taking buyers, an efficient 
allocation is not necessarily envy-free. 
No envy is a stronger property than efficiency, so it follows that many VCG-like 
11 Svensson (1983) provided a statement analogous to our Proposition 2. He studied the problem 
of allocating indivisible commodities with sidepayment when each agent gets at most one indivisible 
good. He noted that envy-freeness implies efficiency when the number of agents is equal to the 
number of indivisible objects. Alkanet al. (1991) extended this observation, allowing any number 
of people and objects. 
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mechanisms fail the no envy test as in the following example. 
Example 1. Envious VCG-like mechanisms: select a VCG-like mechanism with 
u(xi, Oi) = Oi lnxi for all i E N. Then, xi = ~0°. R and !!Ei = Rof.\i [u~(x·) - f!.Jy_] N 8()i ()N t t R 0 
Suppose ON\i =/= 0. The first order condition of the equilibrium is u~(xi) =~if xi> 0 
and u~(xi) :::; ~ if Xi = 0. Applying the no envy condition, we have ;::=;j = 0;_ for 
xi > 0. Thus, no envy holds if and only if 
The left hand side of the equation is additively separable w.r.t. Oi and Oj, so that its 
cross derivative, 82 (hi(oat;;o~j(O-j)) should be zero. However, the right hand side's cross 
derivative w.r.t. Oi and Oj is (Oj - Oi)/0~ =/= 0. Therefore, with the surrogate utility 
function u(xi,Oi) = Oilnxi, the VCG-like mechanism is not envy-free. Likewise, we 
can show that with u(xi, Oi) = Oifti, the VCG-like mechanism generates envy among 
agents. 
When the sum of payments made by agents at an equilibrium is positive, the 
mechanism produces revenue. We do not assume that the center has an objective to 
achieve when spending the residual money. To eliminate possible manipulations by 
the center or by the participants, the revenue cannot be a desirable income of the 
center or be paid back to agents. It should be burnt or wasted by the benevolent 
center. In the other case, the mechanism needs financial inflow from an outside source 
if the sum of payments is negative. It is a burden for the center to acquire money 
inflow to subsidize agents. Therefore, it is good to have no revenue or no financial 
inflow. We will discuss what happens in VCG-like mechanisms in terms of money 
waste or money inflow. 
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Given u E un, The budget imbalance of a mechanism is denoted by .0.(u). When 
a mechanism charges each agent i of ti, the budget imbalance is 
.0.(u) = L ti(e) 
iEN 
where e is a vector of equilibrium strategies. If .0.(u) > 0 for every u, the mechanism 
has a budget surplus; if .0.( u) = 0 for every u, it is budget balanced; for the case of 
.0. ( u) < 0 for every u, it has a budget deficit. 
As VCG mechanisms fail to be budget balanced, 12 we will show that VCG-like 
mechanisms cannot achieve budget balance. 
Proposition 3. Every VCG-like mechanism fails to be budget balanced. 
The mechanism we propose in the next section is a VCG-like scalar strategy 
mechanism. Since its payment scheme has a very simple form and the mechanism 
is envy-free, we call the mechanism the Simple Envy-Free (SEF) mechanism. The 
efficiency of the SEF mechanism will be discussed in great detail. Its fairness and 
budget imbalance will be given concrete descriptions. 
2.3 The SEF Mechanism 
In this section, we will introduce an envy-free VCG-like mechanism, the SEF mecha-
nism, and discuss its properties. The SEF mechanism is constructed in the following 
way. Resource allocation is determined to be proportional to strategies, so that the 
allocation to individual i is Xi = :~ R where eN = 2.:::iEN ei > 0. If eN = 0, then 
12Refer to Green and Laffont (1979). 
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Xi = 0 for all i E N. The payment scheme ti assigned to each i is ti = 0/}N\i- s_i 
where ()N\i = ()N- ()i,s = ~iENo;, and s_i =s-o;. Additionally, let O'jy = (ON)2 . 
Payment made by some agents can be negative, which means that they are subsidized 
by the mechanism. 
Simple Envy-Free Mechanism: In the Simple Envy-Free mechanism (SEF 
mechanism), agent i's net utility from submitting ()i is 
For all i E N, if we set a surrogate function of a VCG-like mechanism to be 
u(xi, ()i) = -tR for Xi, ()i E R++ and residual payment scheme to be h(O-i) = 
-O'fv\i- S_i where O'fv\i = (ON\i) 2 , we can see that this VCG-like mechanism is the 
SEF mechanism. 
There is a caveat when we use the SEF mechanism. The identities of participants 
should be known to the mechanism. Otherwise, as we can see in the following example, 
some agents can benefit from submitting shill bids. 
Example 2. If two agents i and j can shield their identities pretending to be one 
agent, they merge their bids to be 0 = ()i + ()j and then submit it to the mechanism. 
Under this bid, they receive x = 9 / Rand pay t = 0 · ()N\i i- S-i-j jointly. Here + N\i,j ' 
Since x = Xi + Xj, the resource share that the agents i and j receive jointly by 
submitting the merged bid is equal to the sum of their original shares. The total 
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payment originally made by two agents is 
ti(ei, e_i) + tj(ej, e_j) = ei(ej + eN\i,j)- e;- s-i-j + ej(ei + eN\i,j)- e;- s-i-j 
= (Oi + (}i)(}N\i,j + 2(}i(}i- e;- OJ- 2S_i-i 
= i- ( (}i - (}i )2 __.: B-i-i 
and this gives i- ti(Oi, (}_i)- ti((}j, (}_i) = (Oi- (}i) 2 + B-i-i 2:: 0. This implies that 
by merging their bids, agents i and j may jointly pay more than the sum of their 
original payments although they receive the same shares. Thus, merging bids is not 
profitable. However, by the same logic, splitting bids is profitable. 
Therefore, the mechanism should prevent identity shielding. For this reason, we 
assume that the number of agents and their identities are known to the mechanism. 
2.3.1 Incentive Compatibility 
The efficiency property and examples discussed in this section hold for all VCG-like 
mechanisms. We will use a concrete form of the SEF mechanism in order to make it 
easier to discuss these aspects. 
To see if a Nash equilibrium exists for this mechanism, we first consider a case 
where every agent submits a bid of 0 to the mechanism. If agent 1 changes his strategy 
from 0 to E such that E > 0, then his net utility becomes u1 (R), which is positive, 
while his net utility is 0 when staying with 01 = 0. Thus, (} = (0, · · · , 0) is not a Nash 
equilibrium. 
There could be an equilibrium in which only one agent submits a positive strategy, 
while the other agents return zeros, but typically this equilibrium is inefficient as we 
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will see in the following example. 
Example 3. Inefficient equilibria: let n = 2 and R = 1. Suppose u1 (x1) = ax1 
and u2(x2) = bx2 for 0 < a < b. At an efficient allocation, agent 1 receives nothing 
and agent 2 should receive 1. As a result, the efficient surplus is b. However, there 
are multiple equilibria where agent 1 receives everything and agent 2 gets nothing. 
Assume that agent 1 reports E > 0 and agent 2 reports 0. Agent 1 does not have any 
incentive to change his strategy since he receives all of the resource but pays nothing. 
Agent 2 does not have any incentive to change his strategy if his net utility decreases 
by submitting a positive number. This is the case when 
that is, b ~ E2. Therefore, (E, 0) is a Nash equilibrium if E > v'b, however, the 
allocation is inefficient. 
Using the same logic as in the previous example, we can identify all inefficient 
equilibria for the SEF mechanism. Note pj(O, O_i) = ~ ( uj(O)- ~) where O_i is (n-1) 
dimensional vector withE> 0 for i'th coordinate and zero for others. pj(O, O_i) :::; 0 if 
and only if J Ruj(O) :::; E. Therefore, (0, · · · , 0, · · · , E, 0, · · · , 0) is a Nash equilibrium 
if and only if E ;:::: max#i J Ruj(O). This type of Nash equilibrium, where one agent 
i receives all of the resource, is inefficient unless his utility function has the property 
such as u~(R) ;:::: uj(O) for all j =1- i. 
Looking at the structure of inefficient equilibria, we make the following interpre-
tation. As long as every other agent j E N, j =1- i has finite uj(O), agent i has an 
opportunity to take the entirety of the resource, resulting in an inefficient equilibrium. 
37 
Thus, to prevent an inefficient equilibrium, for each agent i E N, there should be at 
least one other agent j =/:. i with uj(O) = +oo. From this example, we can make the 
following assumption which ensures that there are at least two agents whose strategies 
are positive. This assumption is commonly used in macroeconomics for production 
functions and is called the Inada condition. However, we do not assume that the 
limits of the derivatives of utility functions towards positive infinity are 0. 
Inada Condition: u~(O) = oo for at least two agents. 
The Inada condition excludes all inefficient equilibria in which one agent receives 
all of the resource. When there are at least two agents receiving positive shares, any 
Nash equilibria in the SEF mechanism are efficient. We prove below that the SEF 
mechanism has Nash equilibria and that all of its Nash equilibria are efficient. 
Theorem 2. Every Nash equilibrium of the SEF mechanism is efficient. 
Since we only assume concavity of utility functions, the SEF mechanism can 
have multiple efficient equilibria in the following example. When utility functions are 
strictly concave, there is a unique efficient equilibrium. 
Example 4. Multiple efficient equilibria: consider a case with two agents. If 
each agent's utility function has a constant slope over a part of the domain, there can 
be multiple equilibria. Let u1 and u2 have the same constant slope over [x1, ~] and 
[~, x2], respectively, where x1 + x2 = R. Then, u~ (x1) = u~(x2), and x = (x1, x2) is 
a Nash equilibrium allocation. Therefore, there are a pair of equilibrium strategies 
fh,02 which satisfy x1 = £h~92 R and x2 = 91~92 R. Likewise, if Q1 E [x1, ~]and 
Q2 E [~,x2] with Q1 + Q2 = R, we again have u~(Q1 ) = u~(Q2 ), and there is a pair 
of equilibrium strategies ()~ and ()~ which satisfies Q1 = 0, 9+1.0, R and Q2 = 0, 9+29, R. We 
1 2 1 2 
can find infinitely many equilibria in this example. 
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2.3.2 Fairness and Budget Balance 
We will examine whether the SEF mechanism satisfies desirable fairness properties 
and will measure the size of budget imbalance. In addition to the no envy concept, we 
will introduce two additional fairness concepts, Ranking and Voluntary Participation. 
If an agent receives a bigger share of the resource than the other agents, he has to 
pay a greater amount than the others. This primitive notion of fairness is represented 
as Ranking (RK). 
Ranking: A mechanism satisfies Ranking if xi < Xj implies ti < tj for any 
i,j EN, i #- j at every equilibrium. 
Individuals are not forced to participate in the mechanism if they would be made 
worse off by participating. There is neither punishment nor discrimination between 
participants and non-participants, so that agents are free to choose whether or not 
they will participate in the game. If equilibrium allocations satisfy this property, the 
mechanism is said to satisfy Voluntary Participation (VP). We assume that xi = ti = 
0 if agent i doesn't participate, that is, he doesn't submit any bid. Then, Voluntary 
Participation is expressed as follows. 
Voluntary Participation: A mechanism satisfies Voluntary Participation if 
each agent i E N has net utility Pi(e) which is nonnegative at equilibrium e. 
The following result shows that the SEF mechanism is not only envy-free but 
also satisfies the two aforementioned fairness properties. 
Theorem 3. The SEF mechanism (i) satisfies Ranking, (ii) achieves Voluntary 
Participation, and (iii) guarantees no envy. 
Remark. Voluntary Participation and Ranking hold without the Inada condi-
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tion, but no envy holds only with the Inada condition. As in Example 3, let ( E, 0) be 
a Nash equilibrium for u1 (x) =ax, u2 (x) = bx and 0 < a < b. At this equilibrium, 
x 1 = 1, x2 = 0 and t1 = 0, t2 = -E2 . Plugging in the no envy condition, we get 
u~ (x1) = t:2 and u~(x2 ) ::; t:2 . This implies a ~ b which contradicts a < b. Therefore, 
this equilibrium allocation is not envy-free. Consequently, we maintain the Inada 
condition in this section. 
Though the SEF mechanism satisfies useful fairness properties as well as effi-
ciency, it can generate a budget deficit and the center may need financial inflow to 
subsidize some agents. 
Proposition 4. The SEF mechanism yields a budget deficit which can range 
from 0 to R>..(n- 1), where >.. is the market clearing price for price taking buyers. 
When every agent submits the same strategy,()= (a,··· ,a), the mechanism's budget 
is balanced. 
2.3.3 Characterizations of the SEF Mechanism 
We will show that the SEF mechanism is characterized by the combination of alloca-
tions, determined in proportion to the agents' strategies, as well as no envy fairness 
under the Inada condition. We provide two characterizations according to different 
properties of the payment scheme. 
Characterization A 
The first characterization assumes that an agent's payment is linear in his own strat-
egy. 
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Property Al. There are at least two agents. The set of strategies 8 equals R~, 
and the allocation is proportional to the submitted strategies: xi = :~ R if () =I= 0 and 
Xi = 0 if () = 0. 
Property A2. The symmetric payment by agent i is the sum of a variable price in 
()i and a fixed price independent of ()i: ti(()) is linear in ()i, i.e., ti(()) = a(()_i).()i+f3(()_i)· 
Property AS. For any utility profiles u1, · · · , Un such that each ui 1s strictly 
increasing, concave, continuous and continuously differentiable for all i E N, the 
mechanism is envy-free. 
Proposition 5. The SEF mechanism is the only scalar strategy mechanism 
satisfying Properties Al-AS up to affine transformations. 
Property Al makes computation much easier. Almost all scalar strategy mech-
anisms that have been developed so far use this proportional form for resource al-
location. For the case of uniform price scalar strategy mechanisms, this form of 
proportional resource shares can be derived by assuming concavity of net utilities 
( J ohari and Tsitsiklis ( 2007)). 
Now we drop the Property A2 of linear payment scheme and provide another 
characterization of the SEF mechanism. 
Characterization B 
Recall that VCG-like mechanisms set a marginal price function g(()) where g(()) = 
u'(xi, ()i) for all i E N and g is a positive and continuous function. Instead of linear 
payment schemes, we consider symmetric marginal price functions. 
Property Bl. There are at least two agents. The set of strategies 8 equals R~, 
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and the allocation is proportional to the submitted strategies: xi = :~ R if f) =1- 0 and 
Xi = 0 if f) = 0. 
Property B2. Marginal price, g( e), is a function of the sum of strategies, therefore 
Property B3. For any utility profiles u 1, · · · , Un such that each ui is strictly 
increasing, concave, continuous and continuously differentiable for all i E N, the 
mechanism is envy-free. 
Proposition 6. The SEF mechanism is the only scalar strategy mechanism 
satisfying Properties B1-B3 up to affine transformations. 
Remark. If we assume that g(e) = l::iEN fi(ei) or g(e) = f(f)N) where eN = 
rriEN f)i' the no envy with proportional allocation results in g( e) = cl log eN. However' 
we cannot easily adopt g( e) = c1 log eN since g( ·) may not be positive. 
2.3.4 Efficiency without the Inada Condition. 
Without the Inada condition, we observed that the SEF mechanism could yield in-
efficient equilibria. Recall that the Inada condition has to have at least two agents 
whose equilibrium strategies are positive. We now introduce two methods to replace 
the Inada condition. Since any alternative assumptions other than the Inada condi-
tion may result in an inefficient equilibrium, we introduce an efficiency index to gauge 
the efficiency loss. 
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The worst-case relative surplus of a mechanism is a real number such that 
where E(u) is the set of equilibrium allocations and x* is an efficient allocation, given 
u EUn. 
The worst-case analysis is commonly used in computer science and operation 
research. There are also precedents in economic literature. For example, Moulin 
(1986) uses it to discuss the pivotal mechanism in the public good provision problem. 
Moulin and Shenker (2001) is an example of worst-case analysis in a cost sharing 
problem. 
Without the Inada condition, it is easy to see that the worst-case relative surplus 
is 0. For instance, let u 1(x) = ax and u2 (x) = bx for 0 < a < b. An inefficient 
equilibrium has a surplus of a and a relative surplus is ajb. As a gets closer to 0, the 
worst-case relative surplus converges to 0. 
Recall that inefficient equilibria can occur when all agents except one submit 
zero bids. In order to prevent the extreme case mentioned above, the mechanism 
may restrict strategies to be strictly positive (Method A) or introduce two virtual 
players whose utilities satisfy the Inada condition (Method B). 
Method A. Restricted Strategies 
Method A imposes a positive lower bound on strategies. Each agent can select(} from 
[t:, oo) for a positive real number E. We will show that using Method A, the worst-case 
relative surplus increases from 0 to 1/n for the case of n participants. First we need 
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to determine the shape of the equilibria under the restriction. 
Lemma 1. Let n = 2 and let the efficient equilibrium strategy be denoted by 
(8i, 82). If 8i ~ 82, the adjusted equilibrium (81, 82) with a lower bound E satisfies 
81 ~ 82. If8i ~ E ~ 82 or8i ~ 82 ~ E, the adjusted equilibrium has the form of(c,82) 
for 82 ~E. 
Applying the same logic that we used for the proof of Lemma 1, we can find the 
adjusted equilibrium for the case of n agents. 
By Lemma 4 of Johari and Tsitsiklis (2004), the worst-case relative surplus occurs 
with linear utility functions. Therefore, computing the worst-case relative surplus for 
linear utility functions is enough to calculate the worst-case relative surplus of the 
SEF mechanism. 
Proposition 7. The worst-case relative surplus of the SEF mechanism improves 
from 0 to 1/n when we impose a positive lower bound on strategy sets. 
Under Method A, the SEF mechanism may have inefficient equilibria, so it cannot 
be envy-free. However, Voluntary Participation and Ranking still hold. 
Method B. Virtual Players 
The mechanism can ensure that the equilibria are efficient by introducing two virtual 
players. These virtual players have infinite marginal utilities at zero shares, so the 
Inada condition is satisfied. This idea is suggested by Yang and Hajek (2006). They 
showed approximate efficiency for a group of VCG-like mechanisms where every agent 
has a strictly concave utility function. We apply their idea to the case of concave 
utilities and use different utility functions for virtual players. 
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Let us describe this idea in detail. A VCG-like mechanism introduces two virtual 
players whose utility functions are Un+ 1 (xn+l) = WE~ and Un+2(xn+2) = (1 -
w)E~, respectively for E > 0 and 0 < w < 1. These virtual players choose 
their strategies Bn+l ;:::: 0 and Bn+2 ;:::: 0 to maximize their net utilities. Let BE = 
( B1, · · · , Bn, Bn+l, Bn+2) be the extension of B including the virtual players' strategies 
and let xE = (xi,··· ,xn,Xn+I,Xn+2)· We can prove that in this E-extended game, 
equilibrium strategies for the first n players are converging to efficient equilibrium 
strategies in the game without virtual players, as virtual players have negligible utility 
functions. 
Proposition 8. (Yang and Hajek (2006)) Let e =limE--tO BE and let the vector of 
the first n elements of B be denoted by B. Then the limit, B exists and B is the efficient 
equilibrium of the original game without virtual players. 
By introducing negligible virtual players, the mechanism achieves approximately 
efficient and envy-free equilibria. 
2.4 Conclusion. 
We showed that VCG-like mechanisms are the only scalar strategy mechanisms which 
achieve efficient Nash equilibria for the problem of allocating a divisible commodity. 
Furthermore, we identified the SEF mechanism as a VCG-like mechanism that is 
envy-free and uses a linear payment scheme. In the future, properties of VCG-like 
mechanisms need to be studied in-depth. We could also consider finding other envy-
free mechanisms among VCG-like mechanisms. Designing an efficient scalar strategy 
mechanism with the smallest budget imbalance should be our most pressing concern. 
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2.5 Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove "only if'' part. Fix u E un and let K = {i E 
Nl (}i = 0} for a vector of strategies,(} for given u. Fori E N\K, the scalar mechanism 
returns a unique vector of allocations x at given (} such that u'(xi, (}i) = ).((}). Let 
f(xi, (}) = u'(xi, (}i)-).((}). Assuming).((}) and u'(xi, (}i) are continuously differentiable 
in (}, f is continuously differentiable and 81~~:,B) = u"(xi, (}i) < 0 for all xi, (}i > 0. 
By the implicit function theorem, there exists a unique continuously differentiable 
function Xi ( (}). Furthermore, the feasibility condition of :L:iEN Xi ( (}) = R assures that 
Xi is not a constant function of (} -i. 
A vector of efficient allocations for u is denoted by xu. Due to the assumptions 
about u, for every i EN\ K, there exists (Jf > 0 such that ui(xi) = u'(xi, {}f) where 
xi > 0 and for i E K, ey = 0 where xi = 0. The vector of strategies (} yielding 
efficient allocations should be eu. 
Recall that a vector of strategies (} is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 
Given(}, the mechanism allocates the entirety of the resource, so :L:iEN\K xi((}) = 
R h ld h ld Th c · E N\K 8xi(B) _ 8(-L,#i,jEN\Kxj(B)) __ "' 8xj(B) S OU 0 . US, 10r Z , 8Bi - 8Bi - L....!j-j.i,jEN\K 8Bi · 
At the efficient allocation xu (which satisfy u~(xi) = uj(xj)) and the strategy eu 
46 
corresponding to xu, we have 
When eu is an Nash equilibrium, we should have 
This relation should hold for an arbitrary u E un and then we have 
~ _,( . e.). axj(e) _ ati(e) 
~ u xJ' J ae. - ae. · jof-i,jEN\K ~ ~ 
Therefore, the payment scheme for i E N \ K is 
jof-i,jEN\K #i 
The last equality holds since u(xi, ei) = 0 for ei = 0. For i E K, Xi = 0 and the 
mechanism determines x(e) to maximize ~iEN\K u(xi, ei) where ~iEN\K Xi = R. 
Thus, for j -1= i, Xj(e) = Xj(e-i) and ti(e) = ti(O, e_i)· Thus, we can write ti(e) = 
- ~#i u(xj, ej)+hi(e_i)· We conclude that the mechanism is a VCG-like mechanism. 
Now we prove "if' part. We can use the argument of Lemma 1 in Johari and 
Tsitsiklis (2007). First we show that e is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all 
i EN, 
(2.3) 
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The optimal value of (2.3) is an upper bound to agent i's net utility without hi(e-i)· 
Given e, if (2.3) holds for all agents, then their net utilities are maximized so that e is a 
Nash equilibrium. For the sake of contradiction, assume that given a Nash equilibrium 
e, (2.3) is not satisfied for some agent i. The problem (2.3) has an optimal solution, 
x* since X is compact and x* -I- x(e). Then, x* satisfies the first order conditions such 
that u~(x:) = A for x; > 0, u~(x:) ::; A for x; = 0 and u'(xj, ej) =A for j E N \ K. 
For i E N \ K, let agent i choose e~ > 0 such that u~ ( x;) = u' ( x;, e~). Then, x* is 
also a solution (2.2) when a strategy vector is (e~, e_i)· Since the solution of (2.2) is 
unique for given (e~, e_i), we have x* = x(e~, e_i)· Then, we have 
#i #i 
= ui(xi(e~, e_i)) + 2::: u(xj(e~, e_i), ej)- hi(e_i) 
#i 
which contradicts that e is a Nash equilibrium. 
Finally we prove that the VCG-like mechanism has an efficient equilibrium. For 
a vector of efficient allocations x*, each agent i, i E N chooses ei > 0 such that 
u~(x:) = u'(x;, ei) for x; > 0 or selects ei = 0 for x; = 0. Since (2.2) has a unique 
solution fore, we have x* = x(e). By the same logic, x*(= x(e)) is also a solution of 
(2.3). Therefore, we conclude that e is a Nash equilibrium .• 
Proof of Proposition 1. Given u E un, let the mechanism have equilibrium 
allocation and payment (x, t). If xi < Xj, by definition, no envy holds if and only if 
ui(xi)- ui(xj) ~ ti- tj and uj(xj)- uj(xi) ~ tj- k This is equivalent to 
Xj- Xi 
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By the concavity of ui E U, for Xi < Xj we have ui(x;;:=~;(xJ) ::; u~(xi)· Considering a 
case in which ui(xi):=ui(xJ) = u'(xi), agent i is envy-free if and only if u'(x·) < ti-tJ . 
Xt XJ 1, 2 2 - Xi-Xj 
Likewise, for another equilibrium allocation where xi >'Xj, agent i is envy-free if and 
only if u~(xi) 2:: ;;:=!;J. If xi = Xj, no envy holds if and only if ti = tj. Thus, agent i 
is envy-free if and only if u~(xi) = ;':=; for xi > 0 and u~(xi) ::; ;':=; for xi = 0. • 
'L J 'l. J 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let a mechanism satisfy the no envy condition. Given 
u E un, let (x, t) be an equilibrium allocation and payment. For any pair of i,j EN, 
i =/: j, we have ;;:=;J = ;~:=;i so that at allocations xi, Xj > 0, we have u~(xi) = uj(xj)· 
If x j = 0, then we have uj ( x j) ::; u~ (Xi). It is easy to see that this is the first order 
condition for efficient allocations. • 
Proof of Proposition 3. An agent i's net utility in a VCG-like mechanism is 
Pi(e) = ui(xi) + L u(ej, xj)- hi(e-i), 
#i 
so his payment is ti(B) = - I::#i u(Bj, xj) + hi(B-i) at an equilibrium e and corre-
sponding allocation x. The mechanism's budget is 
iEN iEN #i iEN 
Budget balance means that I::iEN hi(B-i) = I::iEN I::#i u(Bj, Xj) holds for any pair of 
equilibrium strategies e. 
Suppose that there exist au which yields budget balance. Let n = 2. Without 
loss of generality, we can assume that x 1 > 0, x 2 > 0 at equilibrium allocations. 
equilibrium strategies e and corresponding allocations X. Equilibrium strategies e 
49 
vary as utility profiles u vary. Thus, the right hand side of this equation should be 
additively separable in Bl and B2. We assume that for i = 1, 2, u(Bi, Xi) is twice 
differentiable in Bi· Therefore, budget balance implies 
82[u(B1, xi)+ u(B2, x2)] 
oB1oB2 = o. 
The partial derivative of il in Xi, u'(Bi, xi) is denoted by fl(o,1)(Bi, xi) fori= 1, 2. Recall 
that the equilibrium condition is written as fl(o,1)(B1, x1) = fl(o,1)(B2, x2) = g(B). 
Now we have 
o(u(Bl, xl) + u(B2, x2)) 
oB1 
The last equality holds since Xl (B) + X2 (B) = R. Likewise, we have 8~2 ( il( Bl' Xl) + 
u(B2 , x2)) = fl(l,o)(B2, x2). Because 80~;02 = 80~;01 , budget balance holds if and only if 
This is equivalent to fl( 1 , 1 )(B1 ,x 1 )~~~ = fl(l,l)(B2 ,x2 )~~~ = 0. We proved that xi is a 
differentiable function of B, so ~~~ and ~~~ cannot be zero. Thus, the budget balance 
requests fl(1,1)(B1, xi) = fl(1,1)(B2, x2) = 0. This implies that for i = 1, 2, u(xi, Bi) is 
additively separable in Xi and Bi, that is, we should have u(Bi, Xi) = j(Bi) + k(xi) 
for some functions f and k. Then, for i = 1, 2, u'(Bi, xi) = 8~~;). This violates an 
assumption about il of VCG-like mechanisms such that for every 1 E (0, oo) and 
Xi > 0, there exists Bi > 0 s.t. u'(xi, Bi) =I fori= 1, 2. Therefore, there is no il that 
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satisfies the budget balance. • 
Proof of Theorem 2. The net utility of agent i with strategy ()i when others 
submit () -i is 
Note that for each agent i, ()N\i =1- 0. Agent i tries to maximize Pi(()i, ()_i) for a 
given ()_i where Pi is continuous and concave in ()i· Therefore, the first order condi-
tions (FOC) are the sufficient and necessary condition to find Nash equilibria. The 
conditions are 
0 if ()i > 0 
< 0 if ()i = 0. 
Since ()N\i > 0, these conditions equal 
u~(:~ R) O'Jv if ()i > 0 R 
u~(:~ R) ()2 < N if ()i = 0. R 
Let IL = ~ and xi= -J;R for ViE N. Then the FOC can be rewritten as 
IL if Xi > 0 
Thus, (} is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i E N, we have 
u~(xi) = f.1 if xi > 0 
u~(xi) ~ f.1 if Xi = 0 
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where f.1 = i, Xi = I; R, and EiEN xi ~ R. We know that an allocation, x*, is 
efficient if and only if it satisfies x* E argmaxxEX EiEN ui(xi)· Since EiEN ui(xi) is 
continuous in x and X is compact, efficient allocations exist. Also, EiEN ui(xi) is 
concave, so the necessary and sufficient first order conditions are 
A if x: > 0 
u~ ( x;) < A if x; = 0 
where A> 0. We can show that f.1 =A. 
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that 11 > A. We denote an equilibrium 
allocation by x and an efficient allocation by x*. Choose i such that Xi > 0. Then, 
u~(xi) = f.1 > A ~ u~(xi). This implies Xi < x;, so R- Xi = E#i Xj > R- x; = 
E#i xj. If this is the case, there should be j =/=- i such that Xj > xj and we have 
uj(xj) ~ uj(xj). Since xj ~ 0, we have Xj > 0 and 11 = uj(xj) ~ uj(xj) ~ A. Hence, 
f.1 ~ A and this contradicts the previous assumption. Therefore, 11 = A. We conclude 
the two FOC's are indeed the same, so that (} is Nash if and only if x = x(B) is an 
efficient allocation. The existence of efficient allocations also guarantees the existence 
of Nash equilibria. Therefore, Nash equilibria exist and they are efficient, as desired . 
• 
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) Suppose that Xi ~ Xj, which is equivalent to (}i ~ (}i· 
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Remember that ti = ()/}N\i- S-i· Then, 
(ii) Since Pi(()i, ()_i) is concave in ()i, it is sufficient to check if Pi(O, ()_i) ~ 0. We 
see Pi(O, ()_i) = S_i > 0 and so VP holds. 
(iii) By the no envy condition from Proposition 1, no envy holds if and only if 
::=;j = u~(xi) at equilibrium allocations. For the SEF mechanism, u~(xi) = i and 
it is easy to check that the no envy condition holds. • 
Proof of Proposition 4. The mechanism collects LiEN ti and we have 
iEN iEN iEN 
(Lei? - n I: e; ::; o. 
iEN iEN 
The second to last inequality holds due to the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Thus, the 
SEF mechanism yields a budget deficit. 
There is a i EN with Xi> 0 and so u~(xi) = i-
BD = ~u~(xi) I: xi- Ru~(xi) = ~>.[Lx;- ~2 ]. 
iEN iEN 
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Observations: 
(a) If ui = Uj for all i -1= j and i,j EN, then (Ji = (Jj for all i -1= j and xi=~ for 
all i E N. Then it is easy to check that the mechanism has a balanced budget. 
(b) Note that the supremum of LiEN x7 for x E X is achieved at the extreme 
points of x EX. Then, we have 
n R2 n R2 
ED= -A[L xz- -] :::; -A(R2 - -) = AR(n- 1). • 
R .N n R n ~E 
Proof of Proposition 5. With these assumptions, agent i's net utility is 
Pi((Ji, (J_i) = uiU~ R) - 9i((J) - h((J_i)· Pi is concave in (Ji since gi is linear in (Ji· 
(J is an Nash equilibrium if and only if we have 
u~(:~ R/;ii R g~((J) if (Ji > 0 
1 (!.!._R)(JN\i R < g:(e) if (Ji = 0 U~ (J N (JJv • 
where g~ ( (J) = 8~J;). With xi = :~ R, these FOC conditions equal 
u~(xi) I ( ) eJ.v if (Ji > 0 gi (J eli 
N\i 
u~(xi) < I ( ) eJ.v if (Ji = 0. gi (J eli 
N\i 
The mechanism is envy-free, so every Nash equilibrium is efficient. We should have 
I ( ) eJ.v A= gi (J -(J R 
N\i 
where A is the market clearing price for price taking buyers and A > 0. Since gi((J) = 
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Bia(B-i) + f3(B-i) for a(B-i) > 0, g~(B) = a(B-i)· Again, A= a(B-i) o:tc for all i E N 
implies a(B-i) = k(}N\i where k is a positive constant. Thus, ti = k(}N\i(}i + f3(B-i) + 
The envy-free condition holds if and only if :i=;. = u~(xi)· That is to say, no 
' J 
envy holds if and only if 
k ((}N\i(}i- (}N\i(}i) (}N + [h(B-i)- h(B-i) + f3(B-i)- f3(B-i)J (}N 
(}i - (}i R (}i - (}i R 
k(}N (}N((}i- (}i)- (Br- BJ) + [h(B-i)- h(B-i) + f3(B-i)- f3(B-i)J (}N 
R Bi - Bi (}i - Bi R 
k (}N ["' Bl] + [h(B-i)- h(B-i) + f3(B-i)- f3(B-i)] (}N 
R ~ ().- (). R 
l#iJ t J 
for any i =I= j such that i,j EN. This is equivalent to 
and again, in the same way, to 
Then, h(B-i) + f3(B-i) = -kS_i +"(where"( is an arbitrary constant. Therefore, we 
have ti = k(}i(}N\i - kS_i + "f· • 
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall u~(xi) = ~~:~~~: = g(B) for every i E N. 
If agent i's resource share Xi is determined proportionally to his strategy (}i, then 
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(e) Re 1oi g(t, e_i) ( ) ti = N\i ( e )2 dt + f3 e_i . 
0 t + N\i 
When the equilibrium allocation is envy-free, we have u~(xi) = ~;=;j for Vi, j E 
N, i =/= j. This equation is the same as g(e) ~;=~ · 0!{. Thus, envy-free Nash 
implementation holds if and only if we have 
for every i =/= j E N. 
Assume g(e) = g(eN)· We want to find a function g(e) and (3(e-i) satisfying the 
following equation: 
(e ) = eN [e . f 0i g(t + eN\i) dt _ e . f 0j g(t + eN\j) dt + (3(e-i)- (3(e-j)] 
g N ei- ej N\t lo (t + eN\i) 2 N\J lo (t + eN\j) 2 R . 
(2.4) 
Multiplying both sides by (ei- ej)jeN and fixing eN\i,j as c, the equation is written 
as 
0 = (ei- ej) · g(ei + ej +c) _ (e- +c) f 0i g(t + ej +c) dt + (e +c) {0j g(t + ei +c) dt 
e i + e j + c J J o ( t + e j + c) 2 t J o ( t + e i + c) 2 
f3(e-i)- f3(e-j) 
R 
Assume that marginal price g( e) is twice-differentiable. Differentiating the previous 
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equation with respect to ()i and ()j, we have 
Since we do not consider the case of ()i = ()j, this is equivalent to 
The solution of this equation should be g(x) = a1x2 + a2 for constants a1 > 0 and a2. 
Without loss of generality, set a 2 = 0. Inserting g(x) = a 1x 2 into the equation (2.4), 
we have Ra1(()I- eJ) = (3(()-i)- (3(()-j) and (3(()-i) = -Ra1S_i + a0 for a constant 
ao. • 
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that for the efficient equilibrium ( ()i, ()~) such that 
()i::;; ()~,We have u~(l/2)::;; U~(r/J+*B.) = (()i + ()~) 2 = u;( 8•8+28.)::;; u;(1/2). If ()i 2: E 
1 2 1 2 
and ()~ 2: E, the efficient strategy will be the adjusted equilibrium and ()1 ::;; ()2 . When 
()i ::;; E ::;; ()~ or ()i ::;; ()~ ::;; E, we can prove that the adjusted equilibrium has the form 
Let ()1 = E. Agent 2 responds with ()2 such that u; C!~2 ) = ( E + ()2?. If this ()2 ::;; E, 
i.e., u;(1/2) ::;; 4£2 , agent 2 likes to play E. If u~(1/2) ::;; 4£2 , agent 1 doesn't have an 
incentive to change his strategy from E. Thus, if u~(l/2) ::;; 4E2 and u;(1/2) ::;; 4£2 , 
then (E, c) is a Nash equilibrium. If agent 2 responds to agent 1's strategy E with 
()2 2: E, i.e., u;(1/2) 2:4£2, agent 1 still plays E as u~C;eJ::;; (c+()2)2. Thus, (c,e2) is 
a Nash equilibrium if 
(2.5) 
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Note that u~ (1/2) :S u~ C_;82 ) :S u;C!~2 ) ::; u;(l/2) and the solution fh exists for the 
equation (2.5). However, if we let ()2 = E and ()1 > E, applying the same logic as before 
leads to u~ (1/2) > u;(1/2), which is contradictory to the condition from the efficient 
equilibrium. Therefore, the adjusted equilibrium is ( E, ()2) for ()2 :2 E. • 
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that every agent has a linear utility function. 
Let n = 2. Let u1 = ax and u2 = bx for 0 < a < b. Agent 1's net utility is 
P1 = a 81 ~82 - ()1 ()2 + ()~ and agent 2' s net utility is P2 = b 81 ~82 - ()1 ()2 + ()i. The first 
order condition for an interior solution is ()1 + ()2 = yl(i for agent 1 and ()1 + ()2 = vb for 
agent 2, respectively. The equilibrium strategy (()i, ()2) without lower bound cannot 
satisfy both first order conditions, so we cannot have ()i :2 E and ()2 :2 E. Suppose 
that ()i :2 E and ()2 ::; E. Since the net utility function is concave, agent 2 will play E 
and agent 1 will play ()1 = yl(i - E for yl(i > E. Then, agent 2 will adjust his strategy 
according toe; = vb- ()1 = vb- ( yl(i- E). We want E to be an equilibrium strategy 
for agent 2, so that e; ::; E holds. This is equivalent to vb ::; yl(i and contradicts 
a < b. Therefore, ()i :2 E, ()2 ::; E cannot happen for the case where a < b to have an 
adjusted equilibrium. 
We can instead think of the case where ()i ::; E and ()2 :2 E. Since the net utility 
function is concave, agent 1 will play E when lower bound E is imposed on his strategy 
set. Then agent 2 will change his strategy to be ()2 = vb- E. Note that from ()2 :2 E, 
we have b :2 4E2. Thus, if b :2 4E2, (E, v'b- E) is a unique Nash equilibrium; and so 
is (E, E) otherwise. The worst-case relative surplus is infa,b aE+~c;:-E) = 0.5 forb :2 4E2 
and infa,b aibb = 0.5 otherwise. Therefore, the worst-case relative surplus is 0.5 for 
n = 2. 
Applying the same logic as n = 2 case, we can prove that for utility functions, 
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U1 (x) = a1x, · · · , Un(x) = anx such that a1 < · · · < an, there is an equilibrium 
(E, · · · , E, Ja;;,- (n- 1)c) where Ja;;,- (n- 1)E;::: E. The relative economic surplus 
(res) is 
E(al +···+an-d+ an(Ja;;,- (n- l)c) 
anJa;;, 
"\XT h . f 1 (n-l)E F vve ave Ill a 1 , ... ,an-l res = - ~ . rom yan 
worst-case relative surplus is ..!.. • 
n 
Ia;; > nE, 1 - (n-l)c > ..!. and the Y '-"n ya;; n 
Proof of Proposition 8. Note that u~+ 1 (0) = u~+2 (0) = oo. In theE-extended 
game, en+l > 0, en+2 > 0 and the first order conditions of the equilibria are for each 
i EN, 
1 WE (1-w)E 
ui(xi(E)) = J = J =>.(c) if xi > 0, 
2 Xn+I(E) 2 Xn+2(E) 
u~(O) ~>.(c) if xi= 0. 
Suppose >.(c) is not strictly increasing in E, i.e., for 0 < E1 < E2, >.(ci) ;::: >.(c2). 
Then, it is easy to check that xi(EI) ~ xi(E2) for all i E N, Xn+I(E1 ) < Xn+I(E2), 
and Xn+2(EI) < Xn+2(E2)· This contradicts the fact that LiEN Xi+ Xn+l + Xn+2 = R 
for any E > 0. Thus, >.(c) is strictly increasing in E. In addition, notice that ). ;::: 
miniEN u~(R) > 0. Since >.(c) is strictly monotone and bounded from below, we have 
limt-to>.(c) = >. > 0. In addition, we get limc-+OXn+I(E) = 0 and limc-+OXn+2(E) = 0. 
Since u~(xi) is decreasing in xi for all i EN, xi( E) is strictly increasing as E approaches 
0 and it is bounded above by R > 0. Thus, xi(E) converges to Xi· Therefore, the 
solution (x(E), >.(E)) of the above FOC converges to the solution (x, >.) of the efficient 
allocation's FOC. • 
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Proposition 9. There is no efficient scalar strategy mechanism which imple-
ments a dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Proof. We will show the nonexistence for the simplest case of n = 2. Remember 
that a scalar mechanism implements efficient equilibrium if and only if, for a given 
utility profile u E U, each equilibrium () with an equilibrium allocation x( ()) satisfies 
the first order condition for efficient equilibria, 
u~(xi(e)) = g(()) for all i EN 
where g is a continuous and nonnegative function. The function g determines prop-
erties of the scalar strategy mechanism. 
Suppose that a scalar strategy mechanism M (g) implements efficient dominant 
strategy equilibrium. Given the mechanism M(g), for every pair of utility profiles 
(u1 , u 2 ), there is a corresponding pair of dominant strategy equilibrium (01 , ()~). 01 
should be a best response of agent 1 to every ()2 E R+, that is, we have 
Likewise, 02 should be a best response of agent 2 to every 01 E 8, that is, we have 
To use simple notations, we will denote u~ by f and u~ by h. Then, f and hare 
·functions of ()1 and ()2 , i.e., f = f(() 1 , ()2 ) and h = h(()1 , ()2)· As a pair of utility profiles 
u E U2 can be chosen arbitrarily, we can say that there are a set F and a setH such 
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that 
F {f(x, y): f is continuous and nonnegative} 
H { h( x, y) : h is continuous and nonnegative}. 
Denoting x = B1, y = B2, x* = rf1 and y* = rf2, equations ( 1) and ( 2) are rewritten as 
follows: 
f(x*, y) 
h(x, y*) 
g(x*,y) for every y E Y 
g(x, y*) for every x E X 
(3) 
(4) 
where X = Y = [0, +oo) and X x Y are the domains of functions f and h. In 
addition, we should have 
f(x*, y*) = h(x*, y*) (5). 
The equations (3)-(5) should hold for any pair off and h from F and H, respectively. 
Note that x* andy* depend on the choice off and h, but g is fixed by the mechanism. 
Let us choose three pairs of (h, h!), (h, h2) and (h, h3 ) from F and H. There 
are corresponding dominant strategy equilibrium pairs: (x1, Yl), (x2, Y2) and (x3, Y3), 
respectively. According to equation (5), we have 
h (x1, yl) = h1 (x1, yl) = g(x1, y!), 
h(x2, Y2) = h2(x2, Y2) = g(x2, Y2), 
h(x3, Y3) = h3(x3, Y3) = g(x3, Y3)· 
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Notice that the function g(x, y) should have same values at each point (x1 , y2 ), (x1 , y3), 
(x2, yl), (x2, Y3), (x3, yl), and (x3, Y2), so we have 
h (X 1 ' Y2) = h2 (X 1 ' Y2) = g (X 1 ' Y2)' 
h1 (x2, Y1) = !2(x2, Y1) = g(x2, Y1), 
!1(x1,y3) = h3(x1,y3) = g(x1,y3), 
f2(x2, Y3) = h3(x2, Y3) = g(x2, Y3), 
h1 (x3, yl) = /3(x3, Y1) = g(x3, Y1), 
f3(X3, Y2) = h2(x3, Y2) = g(x3, Y2)· 
Taking x1, x2, X3, Y1, Y2, and Y3 as unknown variables to solve, we have 6 
unknown variables with 9 equations. Considering that f and h are arbitrarily selected, 
a function g cannot exist in this situation. • 
Proposition 10. Neither uniform pricing scalar strategy mechanism with pro-
portional allocations is efficient or envy-free. 
Proof. Under a uniform pricing scalar strategy mechanism, agent i's net utility 
is ui ( :~ R) - p( B):~ R where p( B) is the uniform price. The first order equilibrium 
condition is u'(x·) = p(B) + ap(O) 0N°i for every i E N. For an equilibrium B to be 
2 2 {)(}i (}N\i 
efficient, 8:~o) ~No, = g(B) for every i EN and a continuous function g. Then, we have 
' N\• 
for every i E N where (3 is a continuous function. 
We show that this equation cannot hold for n = 2. For the sake of contradiction, 
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suppose that it holds for the case of two agents. We have 
From the second and third equations, we have 
This equation should hold for any 01 , 02 E [0, oo) and the left hand side is additively 
separable in 01 and 02 . The cross derivative of the right hand side is 
and it should be zero where 91(01,02) = 89~~~02 ) and 92 (01,02 ) = 89~~~02 ). Solving the 
equation such that the cross derivative of the right hand side equals zero, we have 
9(0) = k 0&-:B:2 for a constant k > 0. However, with this function 9, 01 f~2 «~~e:))dt 
and 02 J~1 «~~~~) dt do not converge. Therefore, there does not exist a 9 function that 
allows the uniform pricing mechanism to be efficient. Finally, due to the no envy 
condition, we can conclude that if a mechanism is not efficient, then it fails to be 
envy-free. • 
Chapter 3 
Optimal VCG Mechanisms to 
Assign Multiple Tasks 
There exist m undesirable objects (or "bads") which are identical and which need to 
be allocated to n, n > m strategic agents. Cries of NIMBY greeting waste disposal fa-
cilities represents a problem of allocating economic bads (Kunreuther and Easterling 
(1996)). Each agent is required to take at most an object. For the problem of assigning 
economic bads, the seminal Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms (Generalized 
Vickrey Auction) achieve both allocative efficiency and incentives by way of money 
transfer. They are uniquely characterized by strategy-proofness1 and allocative effi-
ciency (Green and Laffont (1977, 1979), Suijs (1996), Holmstrom (1979)). However, 
it is not possible for VCG mechanisms to be budget balanced at all valuation profiles 
(Green and Laffont (1979)). If there is a budget surplus, then it needs to be discarded 
by a benevolent residual claimant in order to preserve the incentive compatibility of 
1 A mechanism is said to he strategy-proof if truth telling is a dominant strategy for every agent. 
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a VCG mechanism. In case of budget deficit, the residual claimant must finance the 
mechanism. Interpreting any budget imbalance as a mechanism implementation cost, 
our aim is to design VCG mechanisms that minimize the budget imbalance. 2 
If we weaken the incentive criterion from dominant strategy, we can use Bayesian 
assumptions for the distribution of utility functions, and therefore calculate the ex-
pected budget imbalance (Bailey (1997)). 3 For the problem of provisioning public 
goods, Deb, Gosh and Seo (2002), Green et a1.(1976) and Green and Laffont (1979) 
give the asymptotic behavior of the expected budget imbalance under the pivotal 
mechanism (Vickrey Auction), and Zhou (2007) provides the same for the problem of 
private good exchange. If we wish to maintain dominant strategy incentive compat-
ibility, we assume no prior and approach the problem using the worst case analysis. 
Moulin (1986) as well as Deb and Seo (1998) investigate the pivotal mechanism in the 
worst scenario for a public good provision problem, and Moulin and Shenker (2001) 
do the same for a cost sharing problem. Goldberg et a1.(2001, 2006) and Aggarwal et 
a1.(2005) as well as Hartline and McGrew (2005) design worst case profit maximizing 
mechanisms. 
Favoring the prior-free above Bayesian approach, we will adopt the worst case 
analysis. We will measure the performance of a VCG mechanism with the worst 
ratio of budget imbalance to efficient surplus over all utility profiles. This index is 
called efficiency loss of the VCG mechanism. Efficiency loss is interpreted as the 
worst implementation cost relative to the created benefit in the mechanism. When a 
2 Parkes et al. (2001) and Faltings (2005) construct budget balanced mechanisms forsaking effi-
ciency or strategy-proofness. 
3In both the public good provision problem and the bilateral trading problem, there exists no 
budget balanced mechanism that is Bayesian-incentive compatible, efficient, and individually rational 
(Laffont and Mas kin ( 1979) and Myerson and Satterthwaite ( 1983)). 
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mechanism has a minimal efficiency loss among a group of mechanisms, it is said to 
be optimal, and its efficiency loss is called optimal efficiency loss. 4 We will develop 
optimal VCG mechanisms in the problem of allocating bads. 5 
The main results are presented in Section 3.2. We not only compute optimal 
VCG mechanisms, but also conduct basic tests of fairness as well. For the basic 
fairness tests, we will adopt unanimity upper bound and individual rationality. If 
a mechanism guarantees each participant a net loss smaller than the loss he would 
experience under random assignment, the mechanism satisfies unanimity upper bound. 
A mechanism is said to be individually rational if participation in the mechanism 
brings each agent a smaller net loss than the loss he would experience in an anarchistic 
state where everyone performs one task on his own. Our intention is to show that 
the optimal mechanisms for "goods" and the optimal mechanisms for "bads" behave 
very differently when we require individual rationality. 
The most relevant articles to our problem have been written by Moulin (2009) 
and Guo and Conitzer (2009). They investigate the problem of assigning multiple 
"goods" and develop optimal VCG mechanisms using the worst case analysis. The 
resulting optimal VCG mechanisms significantly improve upon the previous in Cavallo 
(2006). 6 
4 Apt et al.(2008) and Guo and Conitzer (2008a) use a different concept of optimality. Their 
optimal mechanisms are defined to be undominated. A VCG mechanism dominates another if it 
always charges less payment against each agent. 
5 As an application of VCG mechanisms to the assignment problem of identical economic bads, 
Porter, Shoham and Tennenholtz (2004) provide an equity test called k-fairness and develop a 3-Fair 
mechanism. Moulin (2010) discusses tradeoffs between efficiency and k-fairness. He constructs a 
VCG mechanism which guarantees each participant a fair share of the qth highest valuation and 
minimizes the efficiency loss in the allocation problem of a single object. 
6 Cavallo (2006) constructs a VCG mechanism to redistribute some of the payment hack to the 
agents in a way that will not affect incentives. For the instance of a single object auction, Cavallo's 
mechanism redistributes to agent i ~ times the second highest hid among bids other than his own 
bid. 
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For the problem of assigning economic goods, Moulin (2009) makes two interest-
ing points. The first being that the optimal loss of any non-deficit VCG mechanism 
is strictly smaller than the optimal loss of any individually rational and non-deficit 
VCG mechanism. Thus individual rationality plays a role when m ~ 2. Both indices 
converge exponentially fast to zero in n if the scarcity ratio !!:! is less than 1 and as 
n 2' 
Jn if r;: ~ ~. Their behavior, however, is quite different if r;: > ~. The optimal loss, 
excluding individual rationality, still converges fast to zero in n, while the optimal 
loss under individual rationality does not converge to zero in n. 
Secondly, Moulin (2009) points that whether or not deficit is allowed does not 
make an essential difference in total optimal loss. The optimal loss of any VCG 
mechanism (allowing deficit) is about one-half (saying exactly, between ~ and 
+n-1 
~) of the optimal loss of any non-deficit VCG mechanism. He conjectures that this 
property still holds true even if individual rationality is imposed. 
' On the other hand, Guo and Conitzer (2009) use the worst ratio of budget im-
balance to the budget surplus of the pivotal mechanism to measure performance. 
Although their design goal is different from the goal in Moulin (2009), their non-
deficit optimal mechanism is the same as the non-deficit and individually rational 
optimal mechanism in Moulin (2009). Individual rationality is irrelevant in Guo and 
Conitzer (2009), since their non-deficit optimal mechanism remains the same even if 
we impose individual rationality. 
In addition, the optimal loss of any non-deficit VCG mechanism in Guo and 
Conitzer (2009) equals the optimal loss of any non-deficit and individually rational 
VCG mechanism in Moulin (2009). This demonstrates that the non-deficit optimal 
VCG mechanism in the former fails asymptotic budget balance altogether when the 
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scarcity ratio is greater than one-half. In addition, according to Guo and Conitzer 
(2009), when m = n-1, the pivotal mechanism will always be optimal among all VCG 
mechanisms. This is undesirable since the efficiency loss of the pivotal mechanism 
is always greater than 1. In addition, similarly to Moulin's findings, allowing deficit 
does not essentially change the optimal loss for Guo and Conitzer (2009) either. 7 
In the problem of assigning "bads", we show that the performance measurement 
suggested by Guo and Conitzer (2009) fails to be in use for all m, m < n. If we 
measure the performance of a mechanism and find the optimal mechanism according 
to the standards in Guo and Conitzer (2009), it rarely redistributes the surplus of 
the pivotal mechanism for every m, m 2::: 2. For m = 1, the pivotal mechanism is 
optimal, therefore there is no redistribution. Thus, the optimal mechanism is far from 
achieving Guo and Conitzer's original objective of redistributing the surplus of the 
pivotal mechanism. We can predict that this optimal mechanism will have a large 
efficiency loss since the pivotal mechanism generates the largest efficiency loss among 
all non-deficit and individually rational VCG mechanisms. This point is shown in 
detail in Appendix 3.4.1. 
In Section 3.2.1, we compute the optimal efficiency loss .\~,m of any non-deficit 
VCG mechanism and its corresponding optimal mechanism for all m and n. For both 
m = 1 and m = n -1, the worst case surplus in the optimal mechanism never exceeds 
2n~3 of efficient surplus (Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.3). Form, 2 ::::; m ::::; n- 2, the 
optimal efficiency loss of any non-deficit VCG mechanism vanishes fast at exponential 
speed in n: .\~,m ~ m~';;_2 (Theorem 1.2). This tells that efficiency loss works well 
as a performance index for the problem of assigning "bads". In addition, similarly 
7The optimal loss with no deficit >..0 and the optimal loss allowing deficit f-LG in Guo and Conitzer 
(2009) relate as follows: for m :S n - 2, ~ = 2_\_ 0 and ~ converges to ! in n given m. 
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to the problem of assigning economic goods, Proposition 1 shows that whether we 
require non-deficit property or not, has no bearing on the total optimal efficiency loss 
in the problem of assigning economic bads as well. 
Section 3.2.2, however, shows that the non-deficit property is incompatible with 
preliminary tests of welfare bounds. Proposition 2 shows that the unanimity up-
per bound test fails under the non-deficit constraint. The non-deficit constraint also 
makes the pivotal mechanism the uniquely optimal individually rational VCG mech-
anism (Corollary 1). 
Interestingly, if the non-deficit constraint is abandoned, individual rationality 
becomes greatly significant to our problem. We compute the optimal pairs of surplus 
loss ..\~ n and deficit loss J.L~ n of any individually rational VCG mechanism and the 
' ' 
corresponding optimal mechanisms for all n and m. 
Theorem 2.1 shows that when assigning a single bad, there exist only two optimal 
individually rational mechanisms. This result differs from the case of multiple bads 
in which we can find an infinite number of optimal individually rational mechanisms. 
For the case of a single bad, the pivotal mechanism is optimal and non-deficit, but 
generates infinite efficiency loss. In contrast, another optimal VCG mechanism does 
not generate any surplus and its efficiency loss due to deficit is 1. The optimal surplus 
loss is infinite times the optimal deficit loss. 
Theorem 2.3 shows that to assign multiple bads, m :2: 3, we can find an infinite 
number of optimal pairs of surplus and deficit loss of any individually rational VCG 
mechanisms. The optimal pairs of surplus loss ..\~ m and deficit loss p,~ m consist of 
' ' 
a frontier such that ..\~ m/A(n, m) + p,~ m/ B(n, m) = 1 where A(n, m) > B(n, m) 
' ' 
for all n and m. The asymptotic behavior of the ratio B(n, m)/A(n, m) such that 
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B(n, m)/A(n, m) ~ (m-~;,~n 2 implies that as more agents participate, a very minute 
amount of deficit loss can replace unit surplus loss. The deficit becomes much more 
inexpensive than surplus as the number of agents increases. By allowing a slight 
deficit, we can almost achieve budget balanced VCG mechanisms. This result stands 
in stark contrast to the outcome of assigning economic goods. For the case of economic 
goods, regardless of individual rationality, unit surplus loss can only be replaced with 
unit deficit loss. Theorem 2.2 also provides similar results form= 2. 
All proofs are gathered in Appendix 3.4.2. 
3.1 The Model 
Let N = { 1, · · · , n} be the set of agents. m of the n agents should perform m identical 
tasks together. The tasks are undesirable, and thus, they are economic "bads" which 
are costly to agents. Every agent is equally responsible and is liable for at most one 
task. It is assumed that 1 ~ m ~ n- 1 (if n = m, everyone performs a task) and 
that a monetary transfer occurs. 
Each agent i, i E N can perform a task with cost ci, which is private information. 
Performing a task causes agent i disutility ci. Let c = (c1, c2,· · · , en)· Given a cost 
profile c E R~, the vector c* E R~ is the permutation of c whose coordinates are 
arranged increasingly: 
Let c_i = (c1, · · · , ci_1, ci+1, · · · , en)· We denote by (c_i)*k the kth lowest cost among 
70 
c1, · · · ,ci-1, ci+l, · · · , Cn. Given a cost profile c E 1?/:, efficient cost for performing 
m tasks is the minimal cost T m (c) = L~=l c*k. 
VCG mechanisms assign tasks to a subset of m agents whose total cost to perform 
m tasks together is minimal. And each VCG mechanism is defined by n arbitrary 
real-valued functions ti on RZ\{i}. The function ti(c-i) represents a monetary transfer 
from agent i to the mechanism given a cost profile c. Agent i's net disutility Vi in a 
VCG mechanism is written as: 
Every VCG mechanism is efficient since an allocation determined by the mecha-
nism always minimizes the total cost to perform m tasks.8 It is strategy-proof since 
every agent is always better off when he reveals his private information truthfully. 
Holmstrom (1979) proves that VCG mechanisms are the only strategy-proof and al-
locatively efficient mechanisms in our model. 
We use .6. to denote the budget imbalance of a VCG mechanism as follows: 
iEN iEN 
Given a cost profile c ERr:_, if .6.(c) = 0, then we have a balanced budget, if .6.(c) > 0, 
a budget surplus exists, and if .6.(c) < 0, a budget deficit is indicated. 
Among VCG mechanisms, the pivotal mechanism (the Vickrey auction) is a 
benchmark mechanism (Green and Laffont (1979)). In the pivotal mechanism, each 
8 The objects go to the agents with the highest valuations in the case of (desirable) "goods", the 
lowest disutilities in the case of bads. 
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agent i's net disutility equals "efficient cost to perform m tasks - efficient cost to 
perform (m- 1) tasks with agent i ignored." If agent i is ignored, other agents force 
agent i to perform one task and allocate residual ( m - 1) tasks efficiently among 
themselves. This implies ti(c-i) = -Tm_1(c-i)· Thus, the net disutility under the 
pivotal mechanism is written as: 
vt(c) = Tm(c)- Tm-1(c-i) for all i and C. (3.1) 
We can simplify equation (3.1) as vt(c) = Ci if Ci ~ c*(m-1) or vt(c) = c*m if Ci ~ c*m. 
Given cost profile c E Rf_, the pivotal mechanism generates a budget surplus of: 
ps(c) = L Vt- Tm(c) = (n- m)c*m. 
iEN 
Whether a mechanism under our consideration generates budget surplus or not, 
it is convenient to write the function ti(c-i) as ti(c-i) = -Tm_1 (c-i)- r( i; c_i), where 
r(i; c_i) is a redistribution scheme for agent i. Thus, the general form of VCG 
mechanisms is given as: 
Vi( c)= Tm(c)- Tm-1(c-i)- r(i; c_i) = vt(c)- r(i; C_i) for all c E Rf_. 
Interpreting budget imbalance as an implementation cost, our VCG mechanisms ask 
the residual claimant to first run the pivotal mechanism. Then, the residual claimant 
distributes a suitable rebate to each agent if there is a budget surplus, or charges 
agents of additional tax if there is a deficit. We rewrite the budget imbalance of a 
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VCG mechanism with a redistribution scheme r as: 
n n 
~(c, r) = ps(c)- L r(i; c_i) = (n- m)c*m- L r(i; c_i)· 
i=l i=l 
Now we will use the worst case analysis to measure the performance of any VCG 
mechanism. The worst case performance index of a mechanism will be defined as the 
largest budget imbalance relative to a meaningful measure of "efficient surplus" over 
all cost profiles. 
Drawing on the concept of opportunity cost, we notice that implementing a 
VCG mechanism actually saves costs when performing tasks. To perform tasks, a 
VCG mechanism will spend the efficient cost while a random assignment, as the 
primitive benchmark, will spend average cost. The saved cost garnered by the VCG 
mechanism is the difference between the average cost and the efficient cost. Thus, we 
define efficient surplus ( es) as follows: 
where CN = l:iEN Ci. 
m 
es(c) = -CN- Tm(c) 
n 
We define efficiency loss as the performance measurement of a VCG mecha-
nism with the redistribution scheme r. It is written as the following number An,m, 
0 < Anm < 00 , -
An,m(r) = sup l~(c, r)l 
cERN es(c) 
+ 
for the case of n agents and m objects. If ~(c, r) > 0 and es(c) = 0 given a cost 
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profile c E R!j_, we set An,m ( r) = oo conventionally. An optimal VCG mechanism is 
a VCG mechanism with a redistribution schemer* which has the smallest efficiency 
loss A~,m = An,m(r*) :::; An,m(r) for any redistribution schemer. 
Another natural estimator of efficient surplus is the spread between maximal 
cost and efficient cost (l:~=n-m+1 c*k - 2:::~= 1 c*k). Using this estimator, Moulin 
(2010) performs the worst-case analysis when the object is a single costly task. The 
corresponding index of efficiency loss is smaller due to an increase in the denominator. 
It is, however, difficult to write a general formula for the optimal loss when m ~ 2. 
Alternatively, we might think that we can use efficient cost as an estimator of efficient 
surplus, but this ultimately fails as Moulin (2010) proves that the index would be at 
least n - 1 for m = 1. 
Using efficiency loss as a performance measure, we compute the efficiency loss of 
the pivotal mechanism (which does not redistribute anything) as follows: 
An,m(O) = sup !!! [ "'m *i + "'n *i] - "'m *i 
cER!f_ n L.._..i=1 C L.._..i=m+1 C L.._..i=1 C 
(n- m)c*m 
(n- m)c*m n 
sup = . 
N !!!.=.!!:. "'~-1 c*i + !!!.=.!!c*m + !!! ""~ c*i m - 1 
cER+ n L,..~=1 n n L.._..~=m+1 
The last equality holds since the worst case occurs when c*1 , · · · , c*(m-1), c*(m+1), · · · , c*n 
are as small as possible. By setting c*1 = · · · = c*(m-1) = 0 and c*m = c*(m+l) = 
· · · = c*n, we find the efficiency loss of the pivotal mechanism. If m = 1, the pivotal 
mechanism has infinite efficiency loss. Given m, m ~ 2, its efficiency loss is increasing 
inn. Since Am+1,m = 1 + m~ 1 , the smallest efficiency loss inn is already greater than 
1. With this, the implementation cost of the pivotal mechanism is too large compared 
to the benefit it creates. Therefore, the pivotal mechanism is not attractive to use, 
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and so we must construct redistribution schemes. 
3.2 Main Results 
We denote by (~) the binomial coefficient. The notation f(n) c:::' g(n) means 
. f(n) 
hm -(-) = 1. 
n-+oo g n 
The notation r* denotes the optimal redistribution scheme when there are n agents 
n,m 
and m objects. Likewise, .\~,m denotes the optimal efficiency loss for the case of n 
agents and m objects. 
3.2.1 Optimal Non-Deficit VCG Mechanisms 
The residual claimant is not required to create financial inflow, so the redistribution 
scheme should be designed to satisfy the following non-deficit constraint: 
Non-Deficit (ND): given r, ~(c, r) ~ 0 for all c E Rf_. 
Theorem 1.1 Let m = 1 and n ~ 3. the optimal efficiency loss of any non-deficit 
VCG mechanism is given as: 
.\* = n- 1 
n,l 2n-2- 1" 
The following linear redistribution scheme defines an optimal mechanism: 
and for n, n 2:: 6, 
where 
3 n-2 
r~, 1 (c-i) = 2::::aA;(c-i)*k + 2::::,BZ(c-i)*k +w~_ 1 (c-i)*(n- 1 ) 
k=1 k=4 
n2 - 2n-2n - 2n + 2 n2 - 2n-1 - 3n + 4 
a;' = 1' a; = (2n-2- 1) (n- 2)n ' a; = - (n- 2)(n- 3)(2n-2 - 1)' 
"'k-2 (n-2) 
* A~,1 A~,1 Dj=1 j 1 
,B --- + -- · --- zfk is even·, k - _ 1 (n-2) (n-2) 
n n k-1 k-1 
"'k-3 (n-2) 
,8* A~,1 A~,1 L..j=1 j 1 f k dd 
k = - ( n - k) - n - 1 G=:~) + (~=:~) i is o ; 
w* 1 = n-
1 
if n is odd; 
n (2n-2 - 1) 
w~_ 1 = 0 if n is even. 
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Remark 1 If the spread between maximal cost and efficient cost is used as an 
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estimator of efficient surplus, the optimal efficiency loss for m = 1 is .X.~, 1 = 2n~--;:~ 1 
when n is odd, and .X.~, 1 = 2n~--;:~2 when n is even (Moulin (2010)). As we mentioned 
in Section 2, this index is smaller than our optimal efficiency loss. 
Theorem 1.2 For 2 ::; m ::; n- 2, (i) the optimal efficiency loss of any non-
deficit VCG mechanism is given as: 
(n m)(n-1) 
.X.* = m-1 
n,m ( _ ) ""m-2 (n-2) + ""n-2 (n-2) 
and (ii) for a fixed m, 
n m Lik=O k m Lik=m k 
m 
.X.* '""_n __ 
n,m - m!2n-2. 
We provide the optimal redistribution schemes corresponding to Theorem 1.2 in 
Appendix 2.5.2 (Lemma 2 and Lemma 3). 
Theorem 1.3 For n ~ 3, the optimal efficiency loss of any non-deficit VCG 
mechanism is written as: 
n-1 
.X.* ----
n,n-1 - 2n-2 _ 1" 
Notice that the optimal efficiency loss for m = n - 1 is the same as the optimal 
efficiency loss for m = 1. 
If we abandon non-deficit requirement, and find the optimal redistribution scheme 
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r#, the corresponding efficiency loss is: 
'# - l~(c, r#)l 
Anm- sup ( ) . 
' cERN es C 
+ 
The following result shows that the total optima1 loss of any VCG mechanism is 
almost the same as the optimal loss of any non-deficit VCG mechanism. 
Proposition 1 The optimal efficiency loss Xft m of any VCG mechanism satisfies 
' 
A~m ~ ~A~,m for all n and m. 
Even if we discard non-deficit constraint, and request the residual claimant to 
finance the mechanism, there is no essential change in the total optimal loss. The 
optimal loss from budget surplus under a non-deficit mechanism is equally split into 
surplus loss (efficiency loss due to surplus) and deficit loss (efficiency loss due to 
deficit). 
3.2.2 Optimal Individually Rational VCG Mechanisms 
In this section, we will restrict our discussion to anonymous mechanisms. 
Anonymity (AN): A VCG mechanism with the redistribution scheme r is 
anonymous if r(i; c_i) = r(c-i) for all i E N. 
A VCG mechanism is expected to cause each agent to have a net disutility less 
than or equal to his disutility under random assignment.9 This notion is expressed 
in the following test: 
Unanimity upper bound (UUB): Vi(c) ~ ~Ci for all i EN and c E R~. 
9 While the random assignment is simple to implement, and strategy-proof, it is not efficient 
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Unfortunately, this test is not compatible with the non-deficit property in our 
model. 10 
Proposition 2 There exists no anonymous linear VCG mechanism that satisfies 
unanimity upper bound and non-deficit. 
A weaker constraint for unanimity upper bound is individual rationality. Indi-
vidual rationality implies that participation in the mechanism will cost any agent less 
than or equal to what it would cost them if they were to perform the task alone. 
Individual Rationality (IR): Vi~ ci for all i EN. 
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 below show that non-deficit requirement is very 
restrictive, and therefore makes the implementation of VCG mechanisms unattractive. 
When there is a single bad, we cannot improve upon the pivotal mechanism that has 
an infinite efficiency loss. Therefore, we will investigate VCG mechanisms that allow 
for a budget deficit. 
With budget deficit permitted, the ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus is 
bounded by >. and the absolute ratio of budget deficit to efficient surplus is bounded 
by f.1: 
~(c) . ~(c) 
if ~(c) > 0, 0 < -(-) ~ >. and 1f ~(c) < 0, 0 < --(-) ~ f.l· 
es c es c 
This two-way worst case constraint is written as: 
ps(c)- >. · es(c) ~ L r(c-i) ~ ps(c) + f.1· es(c) for all c E R~. (3.2) 
iEN 
10Moulin (2010) proves a similar but more universal point for the case of a single bad. Form= 1, 
the unanimity upper bound test fails under the non-deficit constraint for general strategyproof 
mechanisms. 
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A pair of (A, f.-l) is said to be feasible if it satisfies constraint (3.2) along with 
individual rationality. Let A be the set of all feasible pairs (A., f.-£). 
For two pairs (X, f.-£1 ) and (A, f.-£) in A, if X 2:: ).. with f.-£1 > 1-l holds or X > ).. with 
f.-£1 2:: f.-l holds, then (A, f.-£) dominates (X, f.-£1). When X > ).. and 1-l' > f.-£, (A, f.-l) strictly 
dominates (X, f.-£1). If a pair (A.*, f.-£*) in A is not dominated by any pairs in A, the pair 
is said to be optimal. We denote the set of all optimal pairs by using 8A and call 8A 
the optimal frontier. A VCG mechanism is said to be optimal if its redistribution 
schemer* generates an optimal pair (A.*, f.-£*) in 8A. 
With this new definition of optimality, we provide the optimal VCG mechanisms 
form= 1 in Theorem 2.1. 
Theorem 2.1 For the case of m = 1, n 2:: 3, there are two optimal anonymous 
and individually rational vee mechanisms. One is the pivotal mechanism whose 
)..~ 1 = oo and f.-£~ 1 = 0. For the other, f.-£~ 1 = 1 with )..~ 1 = 0, and its linear 
' ' ' ' 
redistribution scheme is r~ 1 ( c_i) = n-1 ( c_i)*1 for all i E N. 
' n 
Corollary 1 For the case of m = 1, n 2:: 3, the pivotal mechanism is the optimal 
anonymous vee mechanism that satisfies individual rationality and non-deficit. 
Remark 2 According to Theorem 2.1, there are only two extreme pairs of f.-£~ 1 
' 
and )..~. 1 for the case of m = 1. The pivotal mechanism has infinite efficiency loss due 
strictly to surplus, and therefore generates no deficit. This phenomenon is unique for 
the case of m = 1, while there are infinitely many pairs of f.-£~ m and )..~ m for m 2:: 2. 
' ' 
In addition, as the other optimal mechanism has f.-£~ 1 = 1 with )..~ 1 = 0 (generating 
' ' 
no surplus), its optimal efficiency loss due to deficit is relatively small, compared to 
the infinite efficiency loss due to surplus of the pivotal mechanism. This implies that 
by allowing deficit, we can save a great deal of efficiency loss. We will observe that 
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this property holds true form~ 2 in the following Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3: 
Theorem 2.2 For the case of m = 2, n ~ 3, the optimal frontier of any individ-
ually rational VCG mechanism is given as follows: 
>. * * 
n,2 + J.l-n,2 = 1 
A(n, 2) B(n, 2) 
where 
(n-1) 
A(n, 2) = n- 1 and B(n, 2) = 2n_; _ 1 . 
B(n, 2) is strictly decreasing inn and B(n, 2) ~ 2::~ 1 • 
Remark 3 The function P(n, 2) = B(n, 2)/A(n, 2) is strictly decreasing inn. As 
the number of agents increases, deficit becomes much more inexpensive than surplus. 
For instance P(3, 2) = 0.5 implies that unit surplus loss can be replaced with 0.5 unit 
deficit loss when there are three agents. Computing P( 4, 2) = 0.33, P(5, 2) = 0.21, 
and P(6, 2) = 0.13, we observe that when more agents participate, the shrinking 
deficit loss can replace unit surplus loss. 
Here we illustrate the optimal redistribution schemes corresponding to Theo-
rem 2.2. If J.J-~ 2 = 0 (non-deficit), the optimal redistribution scheme is r*(c-i) = 
' 
n~2 (c-i)* 1 . For the opposite case, >.~.2 = 0 (deficit only), the redistribution scheme 
of the optimal individually rational VCG mechanism is given as follows: 
6 n-1 
r*(c-i) = L ak(c_i)*k + L f3'k(c-i)*k 
k=1 k=7 
81 
where 
5[(n;1) _ (2n-2 _ 1)]. 
(n~3) (2n-2 _ 1) ' 
2 (n-1) ""'n-2 (n-2) (3* 2 L.Jl=k l 
k = - (2n-2- 1) (~::::i) (n- k) if k is odd; 
2 (n;1) 
f3Z = (2n-2- 1)(n- k + 1) 
2(n-1) [k (n-1) _ En-2 (n-2)] 
2 n k-2 l=k-3 l if k is even. (2n-2 - 1) (~::::i) (n- k) 
In addition, the optimal redistribution schemes for any J-L~,2 > 0 are provided in 
Appendix 2.5.2 (Lemma 4). 
Theorem 2.3 Form, 3 ~ m ~ n- 1, the optimal frontier of any anonymous 
and individually rational VCG mechanism is given as: 
),* * 
n,m + f-Ln,m = 1 
A(n, m) B(n, m) 
where 
(n-1) n 
A(n, m) = Emr_::;(1n-2) 
- m-1' 
k=O k (n-1) nm 
B(n m) - m-1 '"""' --
' - ""'m-3 (n-2) + _!!!...._ ""'n-2 (n-2) - m!2n-2. 
L.Jk=O k n-m L..Jk=m-1 k 
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Remark 4 We conjecture that for a fixed m, the function P( n, m) = !~:::~ is 
strictly decreasing inn as is P(n, 2). This implies that the more agents participate, 
the smaller deficit loss that results can replace unit surplus loss. Because P( n, m) ~ 
m(m~J!~n 2 , more participation enables this replacement to be effective: the deficit 
becomes much more inexpensive than surplus as the number of agents increases. This 
behavior is not present in the problem of assigning economic goods. As Moulin (2009) 
discusses, individual rationality does not affect the relationship between surplus loss 
and deficit loss. For the case of economic goods, unit surplus loss can be replaced 
with unit deficit loss regardless of individual rationality. 
Remark 5 Recall that the optimal loss of the pivotal mechanism is m~l. A( n, m) 
~ mr:.._l in Theorem 2.3 tells us that the optimal mechanism converges to the pivotal 
mechanism if deficit is not allowed. Again, the efficiency loss of the pivotal mechanism 
increases as more agents participate and its implementation cost always exhausts the 
entirety of efficient surplus. 
3. 3 Conclusion 
Contrary to expectations, individual rationality significantly changes the characteris-
tics of optimal mechanisms when facing the problem of assigning bads. Additionally, 
we need to run further equity tests on our optimal mechanisms. Although we pro-
vide a partial answer in Al, a more systematic analysis of the relationship between 
different performance measures could raise interesting questions. 
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3.4 Appendices 
3.4.1 Discussion 
We will illustrate that the alternative performance measure in Guo and Conitzer 
(2009) does not work in the problem of assigning bads. According to Guo and Conitzer 
(2009), the index is defined as: 
l~(c, r)l 
TJn,m(r) = sup ( ) . 
cE'RN pS C 
+ 
The optimal "GC" mechanism is a VCG mechanism with a redistribution schemer* 
that generates TJ~,m = rJn,m(r*) :::; rJn,m(r) for any redistribution schemer. The follow-
ing propositions show that this measure is inappropriate since its optimal mechanism 
cannot even achieve its original goal. 
Proposition 3 below presents the optimal "GC" mechanism and the correspond-
ing index. Proposition 4 proves that the "GC" optimality fails to achieve its original 
objective. 
Proposition 3 The optimal non-deficit linear "GC" mechanism has the index: 
(n-1) 
* m-1 
TJn,m = ""~-1 (n-:-1) · 
L.JJ=O J 
If m = 1, the mechanism redistributes nothing. Form ;:::: 2, its redistribution scheme 
r is written as r*(c-i) = E;;:/ ak:(c-i)*k. Ifm is odd, ak: = ( -l)kak and ifm is even, 
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ak = ( -1)k-1ak. Here we write: 
(n _ m) 2::~.::::1 (n-:-1) (n _ m) (n-1) ~~-1 (n-:-1) 
ak = J-0 J * - m-1 L...,J=O J 
k(n-1) 'fln,m- k(n-1) ~~ 1 (n-:-1) 
k k L...,J=O J 
Proof. The worst case constraint is as follows: 
The non-deficit and worst case constraints are written together as: 
(n- m)c*m;::: L r(i; c_i) ;::: (1- 'f/n,m)(n- m)c*m. 
iEN 
Again, the system of inequalities is symmetric across all variables, so we will construct 
a symmetric redistribution scheme r(c-i)· We can write: 
L r(c-i) = nao + (n- 1)a1 · c*1 + (a1 + (n- 2)a2)c*2 + (2a2 + (n- 3)a3)c*3 + · · · 
iEN 
+ ((n- 3)an-3 + 2an-2)c*(n-2) + ((n- 2)an-2 + an-1)c*(n-1) 
Step 1: We first show that the non-deficit and worst case constraints imply 
am= am+1 = · · · = an-1 = 0 and ao = 0. For cost profile c*1 = c*2 = · · · = c*n = 0, 
non-deficit and worst case constraints imply 0 ;::: na0 ;::: 0, that is, a0 = 0. For a 
cost profile c*1 = c*2 = · · · = c*(n-1) = 0 and c*n = 1, the two constraints imply 
0 ;::: (n- 1)an-1 ;::: 0, so an_1 = 0. For a cost profile c*1 = · · · = c*(n-2) = 0 and 
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c*(n-1) = 1, the constraints imply 0 2': (n- 2)an_2 2': 0, so an_2 = 0. Likewise, we can 
conclude that am = ... = an-1 = 0. 
Then, the non-deficit and worst case constraints are written as: 
0 2': (n- 1)a1 · c*1 + (a1 + (n- 2)a2)c*2 + (2a2 + (n- 3)a3)c*3 + · · · 
+ ((m- 2)am-2 + (n- m + 1)am-1)c*(m-1) + ((m- 1)am-1 + (n- m)( -1))c*m 
and 
0 :::;; (n- 1)a1 · c*1 + (a1 + (n- 2)a2)c*2 + (2a2 + (n- 3)a3)c*3 + · · · 
+ ((m- 2)am-2 + (n- m + 1)am_I)c*(m-1) 
+ ((m- 1)am-1 + (n- m)( -1 + TJn,m))c*m. 
Applying Lemma 1, we transform the original optimization problem into a linear pro-
gram. We aim to minimize TJn,m satisfying the non-deficit and worst case constraints 
as follows: 
(n- m) 2': (m- 1)am-1 2': (n- m)(1- T/n,m) 
(n- m) 2': (m- 2)am-2 + nam-1 2': (n- m)(1- T/n,m) 
(n- m) 2': (m- 3)am-3 + n(am-2 + am-d 2': (n- m)(1- TJn,m) 
(n- m) 2': a1 + n(a2 + a3 + · · · + am-1) 2': (n- m)(1- TJn,m) 
(n- m) 2': n(a1 + a2 + a3 + · · · + am-1) 2': (n- m)(1 - T/n,m)· 
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Step 2: Let a redistribution scheme f(c-i) = :L;:-;_1 ak(c-i)*k generate iJn,m· Sup-
pose that TJn,m ::::; 'f/~,m· Let Xk = L~lc1 aj and let xi:: = :L~Ic1 a; fork= 1, ... 'm -1. 
If m is odd, observe that 
(m- 1)x:n_1 = (n- m)(1- 'fl~m) 
' 
(m- 2)x:n_2 + (n- m + 2)x:n_1 = (n- m) 
(m- 3)x:n_3 + (n- m + 3)x:n_2 = (n- m)(1- 'f/~,m) 
(m- 4)x:n_4 + (n- m + 4)x:n_3 = (n- m) 
2x; + (n- 2)x*3 = (n- m)(1- 'f/~ m) 
' 
x~ + ( n - 1 )x; = ( n - m) 
nx~ = (n- m)(1- 'f/~ m)· 
' 
Since the redistribution scheme f satisfies non-deficit and worst case constraints, 
we have (m- 1)xm-1 ~ (n- m)(1 - TJn,m)· In addition, we have TJn,m ::::; 'f/~,m and 
(m-1)x:n_1 = (n-m)(1-'fl~m)· We can then conclude Xm_1 ~ x:n_1 . The constraints 
' 
also give (n- m) ~ (m- 2)xm_2 + (n- m + 2):i;m_1, and the previous observation 
gives (m- 2)x:n_2 + (n- m + 2)x:n_1 = (n- m). With Xm-1 ~ x:n_1 , we conclude 
Xm-2 ::::; x:n_2 . Applying the same logic from the third to the (m- 1)th constraints 
and observation, we know Xm-3 ~ x:n_3, Xm-4 ::::; x:n_4, · · ·, X1 ::::; xi (the direction of 
inequality is alternating). Finally, the mth constraints give nx1 ~ (n- m)(1- iJn,m) 
and the observation gives (n- m)(1- 'f/~,m) = nxi, so x1 ~xi. Concluding X1 =xi 
and iJn,m = 'f/~,m' we have xi = x; fori = 1, · · · , m-1, and this implies that ak = ai:: for 
k = 1, · · · , m-1. Therefore, 'f/~ m is optimal, and r* is a unique optimal redistribution 
' 
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scheme. • 
Proposition 4 
(i) Form fixed, 'f}~,m increases inn and it converges to 1. 
(ii) For n fixed, 'f}~,m decreases in m. 
(iii) Form fixed, the largest ratio of budget imbalance to efficient surplus (efficiency 
loss) of the optimal "GC" mechanism diverges inn if m is even: 'rJ~,m ~ n and 
it is infinite if m is odd. 
Proof. 
( k ) ""m-1 (k-1) ( k-1) ""m-1 (k) h(k + 1) _ h(k) = m-1 ~j=O j - m-1 ~j=O j 
""r:"-1 (k) 0 ""r:"-1 (k-:-1) ~J=O J ~J=O J 
( k-1) m-1 (k) 
m-1 1 . 0 
= (k _ m + 1) I:m-1 (k). I:m-1 (k-:-1) L)m- - J) j > · 
J=O J J=O J J=O 
which implies that h is increasing in n. Finally, limn--+oo 'f}~,m = 1. This is because 
(n-1) rv nrn-1 and ""m-1 (n-1) rv nrn-1 
m-1 - (m-1)! ~j=O j - (m-1)! · 
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we have 
l(k+l)-l(k)~(~(n~l))' _ (t,(n~l))(~(n~l)) 
~(~ (n~ !)) ( _ (n~ 1) +(~=D)+ (n~ !)(~= D 
and thus, L(k) is increasing in k. With £(2) > 0, L(k) is positive for any k ;::: 2, so 
l(k) increases ink. Therefore, 7J~m decreases in m. 
' 
(-1) 1 (n-m)(;;',~D (iii) Suppose m is even. Then, l · az + (n - l - 1) · al+l = E~o1 (n~ 1) for 
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0 < l < m- 2 and (m- l)a 1 = (n- m) ET=o2 (nt) S1"nce we have 
- - m- "m-1 (n-:-1) • 
L..J=O J 
m-2( l)l( )(n-1) "'m-2(n-1) 
"""'r*(c_ ·) = """' - n- m m-1 *(l+l) + ( _ ) L.Jj=O j *m ~ ~ ~ "'m-1 (n-1) c n m "'m-1 (n-1) c ' 
iEN l=O L.Jj=O j L.Jj=O j 
the efficiency loss of the optimal "GC" mechanism is 
[ "'m *k "'m-1 *k] n L.J k=2 c - L.Jk=1 c 
. sup even odd 
"'n *k ( ) "'m *k . cER:t. m L.Jk=m+1 C - n - m L.Jk=1 C 
Observing that the ratio increases as c*(m+l) c*(m+2) · · · c*n decrease we write 
' ' ' ' 
[ "'m *k "'m-1 *k] n L.J k=2 c - L.Jk=1 c 
S even odd 
up "'n *k ( ) "'m *k 
cER:t. m L.Jk=m+1 C - n - m L.Jk=1 C 
[ *m + "'m-2 *k "'m-1 *k] n c L.J k=2 c - L.Jk=1 c 
~p ~- ~ . 
cER:t. (n- m) [(m- l)c*m- 2:~::/ c*k- L7:::i c*k] 
odd even 
Notice that given c*1 c*3 · · · c*(m-1) the ratio increases as c*2 c*4 · · · c*(m-2) m-
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
crease. Thus, the expression is written as 
sup m 1 ] 
cERN (n- m) [(m- l)c*m- c*1 - 2 Lk::a c*k 
+ odd 
n(c*m- c*1) n 
sup [ J 
cER:t. (n- m) (m- l)c*m- c*1 - (m- 2)c*m n- m 
The second last equality holds since the ratio increases as c*3, c*5, · · · , c*(m-1) increase. 
Th \ n(;;,-=.i) nr k h (n-1) nm d "'m-1 (n-1) nm-1 US, A = L:m-1 (n-:-1). vve nOW t at n m-1 ~ (m-1)! an L...Jj=O j ~ (m-1)! · 
J=O J 
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Therefore, >. ~ n if m is even. Similarly, if m is odd, m ~ 3, 
n{ [(n-1) + 2 ~~-2 (n-1)] c*m + (n-1) [ ~m--2 c*k - ~m_:::-1 c*k]} (n- m) m-1 L..JJ-0 k m-1 L..Jk-1 L..Jk-2 ). = SU odd even ~m-1 (n-1) P ~n *k ( ) ~m *k 
L..Jj=O j cE'R!j_ m L..Jk=m+l C - n - m L..Jk=1 C 
n{ [(n-1) + 2 ~~-2 (n-1)] c*m + (n-1) [ ~m__::-2 c*k - ~m_:::-1 c*k]} (n- m) m-1 L..JJ-0 k m-1 L..Jk-1 L..Jk-2 
= SU odd even L:~~1 (nj1) eEl:: (n- m) [(m- 1)c*m- L:~~2 c*k- L:J:~i c*k] 
odd even 
The last equality holds since the ratio increases as c*(m+l), · · · , c*n decrease. Observ-
ing that the ratio increase as c*1, c*3 , · · · , c*Cm-2) increase, we write 
[( n-1) 2 ~m-2 (n-1)] *m >. ( n - m) n m-1 + LJ j =0 j c 
= L:~~1 (nj1) c~i:: ( n - m) [ ( m - 1 )c*m - 2 L:7:;:i c*k J 
even 
[( n-1) 2 ~m-2 (n-1)] *m (n- m) n m-1 + L..Jj=O j c 
= sup = oo. L:~~1 (nj1) cE'R!j. (n- m) [(m- 1)c*m- (m- 1)c*m J 
The second last equality holds since the ratio increases as c*2, c*4, · · · , c*Cm-1) increase. 
If m = 1, we know the pivotal is optimal and its efficiency loss is infinite. • 
The statement (i) points out that the pivotal mechanism becomes optimal as 
the number of agents increases. The optimal mechanism fails to redistribute any of 
the budget surplus of the pivotal mechanism. The statement (iii) shows that the 
efficiency loss of the optimal "GC" mechanism diverges in n or is infinite. Therefore, 
throughout this paper, we insist that we measure the performance of a mechanism 
by a worst case ratio whose denominator is efficient surplus. 
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3.4.2 Proofs 
We will use notations as follows: 
t' 
B!,t' = L (~) ' 
k=t 
B-+t = BO,t 
s s 
L Xk = x2 + X4 + · · · and L Xk = x1 + X3 + · · · . 
j=2 j=l 
even odd 
Lemma 1. 
(i) b1c1 + · · · + bnCn < 0 for 0 < cl < 
k = 1,· · · ,n. 
(ii) b1c1 + · · · + bnCn > 0 for 0 < cl < < Cn if and only if "L,7=k bj > 0 for 
k = 1,· · · ,n. 
for 0 :S C1 :S · · · :S Cn if and only if bndn + ("L,7=n-l bj )dn-1 +("L,7=n-2 bj )dn-2+ · · · + 
("L,7=l bj)d1 ::; 0 for all di ~ 0, i EN. Setting for each i EN, di = 1 and dj = 0 for 
all j E N, j =1- i, we have the statement proven. (ii) can be proven in the same way . 
• 
Proof of Theorem 1.2 
Statement (i) 
Firstly, we will show the statement for the case of m, 4::; m ::; n- 2. 
Case 1. m is odd: 
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The worst case constraint is as follows: 
), 2:: (n- m)c*m- 2::~1 r(i; c_i) 
!I! ""'n . _ ""'m *i 
n ui=1 C~ ui=1 C 
The non-deficit and worst case constraints are characterized by a system of linear 
inequalities as follows: 
n n m 
(n- m)c*m 2:: L r(i; c_i) 2:: (n- m)c*m- >.(: L Ci- L c*i). 
i=1 i=1 i=1 
In the inequalities above, both sides of 2::~= 1 r(i; c_i) is symmetric in all variables. 
If every r(i; c_i) for i E N satisfies all inequalities, we can construct a symmetric 
scheme r meeting the inequalities. The symmetric scheme is written as r( c_i) = 
~ EiEN,7rEIT r( i; c-::_i) where II is the set of all permutations of N \ { i} and c-::_i results 
from permuting the coordinates of c_i accordingly. Therefore, it is natural to restrict 
our discussion to symmetric redistribution schemes. r(i; c_i) will be denoted by r(c-i) 
from now on. 
Let en-k = (0, 0, · · · , 0, 1, 1, · · · , 1), en-k E Rn for k = 0, 1, · · · , n where 2::~= 1 
( en-k) · = n - k Let En- 1-k = (0 0 · · · 0 1 1 · · · 1) En- 1-k E Rn-1 for k = 
t 0 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
0, 1, · · · , n- 1 where E~:11 (En- 1-k)i = n- 1 - k. Define Pk = r(En- 1-k) for k = 
0, · · · , n - 1. The set { e 0 , e1, · · · , en} is a basis of C, C = { c E R~ I c1 ~ c2 ~ · · · ~ 
en}. Each c* E Cis uniquely written as a linear combination of elements of the basis. 
Since c_i = (En-1 -En-2)(c-i)*1+ (En-2- En-3)(c-i)*2 + ... +(E3_ €2) (c_i)*(n-3) 
+(E2- E1) (c-i)*(n-2) +E1(c-i)*(n-1), the redistribution scheme is written as r(c-i) 
= (Po- P1)(c-i)*1 +(P1- P2)(c-i)*2 + · · · + (Pn-3- Pn-2)(c-i)*(n-2) +Pn-2(c-i)*(n-1) · 
Recall that ps(c) = (n- m)c*m and es(c) = r;: EiEN ci- EZ:,1 c*i. For a cost 
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profile en-k, we notice that if 0 ~ k ~ m- 1, es(c) = ~(n- m) and ps(c) = n- m 
and if m ~ k ~ n, es(c) = ~(n- k) and ps(c) = 0. 
Now we will apply en-k for various k's. When k = 0, the non-deficit and worst 
case constraints are written as n - m ~ np0 ~ n - m, so p0 = n--:,_m. When k = n, the 
two constrains are written as 0 ~ npn_1 ~ 0, so Pn-1 = 0. Applying en-k for other k, 
1 ~ k ~ n- 1, the non-deficit and worst case constraints are written as follows: 
( n - m) ( 1 - ~ - ~) ~ ( n - 1) P1 ~ ( n - m) ( 1 - ~) 
(n- m) ( 1- ~A) ~ 2p1 + (n- 2)p2 ~ n- m 
(n- m) ( 1- ~A) ~ 3p2 + (n- 3)p3 ~ n- m 
( m-1 ) (n- m) 1- n A ~ (m- 1)Pm-2 + (n- m + 1)Pm-1 ~ n- m 
m(n- m) 
- A ~ ffiPm-1 + (n- m)pm ~ 0 
n 
m(n- m -1) 
- A ~ ( m + 1) Pm + ( n - m - 1) Pm+l ~ 0 
n 
2m --A~ (n- 2)Pn-3 + 2Pn-2 ~ 0 
n 
m --A~ (n- 1)Pn-2 ~ 0. 
n 
We will use the notations M and p as follows: 
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(n- 1) 0 0 0 0 
2 (n- 2) 0 0 0 P1 
0 3 (n- 3) 0 0 P2 
M= andp = 
0 0 0 3 0 Pn-3 
0 0 0 (n- 2) 2 Pn-2 
0 0 0 0 (n- 1) 
Then, M is a (n- 1) X (n- 2) matrix and p E nn-2. Using the notations of 
M and p, the central part of above inequalities is written as the follows: (M p)I = 
(n- 1)pl, (Mp)2 = 2pl+(n- 2)p2, (Mp)3 = 3p2+(n- 3)p3, · · ·, (Mp)n-2 = (n-
2)Pn-3 + 2Pn-2 and (M P)n-l = (n- 1)Pn-2· 
By computing the null space of the transposed M, we find the hyperplane of 
nn-l as the range of M. For X in the range of M, the hyperplane is presented as 
and the last term (n:_1)Xn-l appears in either side depending on whether n is odd or 
even. The no deficit and worst case constraints imply that 
and 
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for 2 :::; k :::; m - 1. And 
for m :::; k :::; n - 1. 
When n is odd, the non-deficit and worst case constraints imply that 
(n-m)[~ (:) -1]2 
odd 
(~)x1 + ~ (:)x. + ~ (:)x. ~ ~ (:)x. + .%1 (:)x, 
odd odd even even 
m-1 ( ) ( k ) n-1 ( ) ~ (n- m) L ~ 1- ;A -A L ~ : (n- k). 
k=2 k=m+1 
even even 
Then, we have 
(n- m) [E~~J (~)- 2:~,;12 (~)J 
A > even odd 
- ( ) "m-1 k (n) "n-1 m ( k) (n) · n- m wk=2:;:;; k + wk=m+1 n n- k 
even even 
Likewise, when n is even, the non-deficit and worst case constraints imply that 
(n-m)[~ (:) -1]2 
odd 
(~)x1 + ~ (:)x. + ~ (:)x, ~ ~ (:)x. + ,~1 (:)x, 
odd odd even even 
m-1 ( ) ( k ) n-2 ( ) ~ ( n - m) £; ~ 1 - ; A - A k];_ 
1 
~ : ( n - k). 
even even 
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Then, we have 
(n- m) [ET:~ (~)- E~=-12 (~)J 
A> even odd 
- ( ) ""'m-1 k (n) ""'n-2 m ( k) (n) ' n- m L..Jk=2 n k + L..Jk=m+l--;;: n- k 
even even 
The optimal efficiency loss is written as follows: 
(n- m) [ET:~ (~)- 2:~==-12 G)] 
).* = even odd 
n,m (n- m) ET:i ~ (~) + E~=m+l 7:(n- k) G). 
even even 
~ (~) - ~ (~) = ~( -l)k (~) = (-l)m-1 (: ~ ~). 
k=O k=1 k=O 
even odd 
From k(~) = nG::::i), we write 
~ k (~) = n ~ (~ = ~) = n ~ (n ~ 1) 
k=2 k=2 k=1 
~- ~- ~ 
=n ~ w~2) + (~=Dl =n[~ (n~2) +}; (n~2)l 
odd odd even 
and 
t m(n- k)(n) = m [n t (n)- t k(n)] 
k=m+l n k n k=m+l k k=m+1 k 
even even even 
=m[ t (n) _ t (n-1)] 
k=m+l k k=m+1 k- 1 
even even 
= [ t (n) _ ~ (n -1)] 
m k=m+1 k k=m k 
even odd 
=m{ t W~l)+(~=Dl 
k=m+1 
even 
-~ w~ 2) + (~=D n 
odd 
= m [t (n ~ 1) _ ~ (n ~ 2)] . 
k=m k=m-1 
Therefore, the optimal efficiency loss is written as 
(n m)(n-1) 
..\* = m-1 
n,m ( _ ) "'m-2 (n-2) + [ "'ii (n-1) _ "'ii-1 (n-2)] · 
n m L.Jk=O k m L.Jk=m k L...Jk=m-1 k 
Case 2. m is even: 
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When n is odd, the non-deficit and worst case constraints imply that 
( 1 ),) m-1 ( ) ( k ) n-2 ( ) n( n - m) 1 - ;;: - ;;: + ( n - m) ~ ~ 1 - ;;: >. - >. k];1 ~ : ( n - k) 
odd odd 
~ (7)x~ + ~ (~)x. + .~1 (~)x. ~ ~ (~)x. + ~ (~)x• 
odd odd even even 
::; ( n - m) I: (~) . 
k=2 
even 
Then, we have 
(n- m) [~~::-/G) - ~7:;:5 G)] ), > odd even 
- ( ) ""'m-1 k (n) ""'n-2 m ( k) (n) · n - m ~k=1 ;;; k + ~k=m+l -;;;- n - k 
odd odd 
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Likewise, when n is even, the non-deficit and worst case constraints imply that 
( 1 ), ) m-1 ( ) ( k ) n-1 ( ) n(n- m) 1- ;;: - ;;: + (n- m) ~ ~ 1- ;;:>- -A k];1 ~ : (n- k) 
odd odd 
~ (7)x~ + ~ (~)x. + .%1 (~)x. ~ ~ (~)x. + ~ (~)x. 
odd odd even even 
::; ( n - m) I: (~) . 
k=2 
even 
Then, we have 
(n- m) [~~1 G)- ~7:;:5 (~)J 
),> ~ n= 
- ( ) ""'m-1 k (n) ""'n-1 m ( k) (n) · n - m ~k=1 ;;; k + ~k=m+l -;;;- n - k 
odd odd 
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The optimal efficiency loss is written as follows: 
(n- m) [E~11 (~) - 2:7:~~ (~)J ). * = odd even 
n,m ( ) "'m-1 k (n) "'n m ( ) (n) · n - m L.Jk=1 :n k + L.Jk=m+l -:;:;: n - k k 
odd odd 
We write E~/ G) - 2:7:~~ (~) = - 2:~,:01 ( -1 )kG) = ( -1 )m (;=~) = (;=~) since m 
odd even 
is even. And we write 
n ~ m ~ k (~) = ( n - m) ~ (~ = ~) = ( n - m) 'f (n ~ 1) 
k=1 k=l k=O 
odd odd even 
even 
and 
n ( ) [ n ( ) n ( )] m """' n """' n """' n - 1 
- L..t (n- k) k = m L..t k - L..t k 1 
n k=m+ 1 k=m+1 k=m+1 -
odd odd odd 
=m L n - L n-1 [ n ( ) n-1 ( )] 
k=m+l k k=m k 
odd even 
=m{ t w~l) + (~=Dl- ~ w~ 2) + (~=DD 
m+1 k=m 
odd even 
=m[t(n~l)- ~ (n~2)]· 
k=m k=m-1 
Therefore, the optimal efficiency loss is written as 
* (n- m)(;=~) 
An,m = ( _ ) "'m-2 (n-2) + [ "'n (n-1) _ "'n-1 (n-2)] · 
n m L.Jk=O k m L.Jk=m k .L.Jk=m-1 k 
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We rewrite the optimal efficiency loss as follows: 
A* = (n-m)(:~~) 
n,m ( _ ) "'m-2 (n-2) + ["'ii (n-1) _ "'ii-1 (n-2)] 
n m 6k=O k m 6k=m k 6k=m-1 k 
where ii = ii if m is odd and ii = fi if m is even. ii = n- 1 if n is odd and ii = n- 2 
if n is even. fi = n - 2 if n is odd and fi = n - 1 if n is even. 
Case 3. m = 2: the non-deficit and worst case constraints are characterized by 
(n- 2)c*2 2:: L r(c-i) 2:: (n- 2)c*2- A[~ L ci- c*1- c*2]. 
iEN iEN 
We apply en-k to the system above. Again Po= n~2 and Pn-1 = 0. Fork= 1, 
1 1 A ( n - 2) ( 1 - -) 2:: ( n - 1) PI 2:: ( n - 2) ( 1 - - - -) 
n n n 
and for n - 1 2:: k 2:: 2, 
Then, we have 
2 
0 2:: kPk-1 + (n- k)pk 2:: -A· -(n- k). 
n 
(n- 2)(n- 1- A)- A£; (~) (n- k)~ :S 0 
odd 
and find the optimal loss. 
Case 4. m = 3: the non-deficit and worst constraints are written as 
(n- 3)c*3 ~ L r(c-i) ~ (n- 3)c*3 - A[~ L ci- c*1 - c*2 - c*3]. 
iEN iEN 
Applying en-k for 0:::; k:::; n, we have Po= n;-:3 , Pn-1 = 0 and for k = 1, 
( n - 3) ( 1 - ~) ~ ( n - 1) p1 ~ ( n - 3) ( 1 - ~) - A ( ~ ( n - 1) - 2) 
fork= 2, 
and for n - 1 ~ k ~ 3, 
Finding 
gives 
Statement (ii) 
Case 1. m is odd: 
3 
0 ~ kPk-1 + (n- k)pk ~ -A-(n- k). 
n 
even 
even 
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We rewrite the optimal efficiency loss as 
.X* = (n- m) (r:=.~) 
n,m (n - m)B--+(m-2) + m [Bm,n - Bm-1,n-1) . 
If n is even, we write 
and if n is odd, we write 
n-2 n-1 n-2 
= 2n-2 _ B--+(m-1) 
n-2 
Bm,ii _ Bm-1,ii-1 = ~ [(n- 1) _ (n- 2)] = ( _ 2) ~ (n- 2) 
n-1 n-2 ~ k + 1 k n + ~ k + 1 
k=m-1 k=m-1 
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Then, we have (r:=.~) ~ (~~-1;,. Note that B-=~-2) is a polynomial of degree 
m - 2 and B-=~-1) is a polynomial of degree m - 1. Thus, we have 
(n- m)B-=~-2) + m(2n-2 - B-=~-1)) ~ m2n-2 
(n- m)B-=~-2) + m((n- 2) + 2n-2 - B-=~-1)) ~ m2n-2. 
Therefore, we conclude 
* (n- m) nm-1 A ~ ·----n,m - m! 2n-2 . 
Case 2. m is even: 
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We rewrite the optimal efficiency loss as 
(n m) (n-1) A.* = m-1 
n,m (n - m)B--t(m-2) + m [Bm,n - Bm-1,n-1] . 
n-2 n-1 n-2 
S. (n-1) n=-1 d mce m-1 ~ (m-1)! an 
Bm,n _ Bm-1,fi-1 = ~ [(n- 1) _ (n- 2)] 
n-1 n-2 ~ k + 1 k 
k=m-1 
I: (n- 2) 
k=m-1 k + 1 
= 2n-2 _ B--t(m-1) 
n-2 ' 
l d \ * (n-m) n=-1 • We COnC U e An,m ~ m! 2n-2 • 
We provides optimal redistribution schemes for m > 3 odd, corresponding to 
Theorem 1.2 in the following lemma. 
Lemma 2 The optimal redistribution scheme form odd is as follows: 
3 m-1 m+3 
r~,m(c-i) = L ak(c-i)*k + L f3f.(c-i)*k + L l'f.(c-i)*k 
k=1 k=4 k=m 
n-m-2 
+ L ~~+k(c-i)*(m+k) + W~-1 (c-i)*(n-1) 
k=4 
where 
2A.~ m(n- m) * -2A.~,m(n- m). 
a*1 = O·, a* ' · a 2 = n(n- 2) ' 3 = (n- 3)(n- 2) ' 
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even 
f3Z = n- m + _n_ ( n- m ) { n- (k- 1)-X~,m _ (k;1) ~ (nj1) 
n- k n- k n- k + 1 n (n) L.t (n-2) 
2 j=2 k-3 
+ 2(k;1) ~ (n- jA~,m)(]=:;) - 2(k;1) } L.t if k is odd; n(~::::;) j=2 j! n(~::::;) 
even 
L tt · L _ n-m '\'3 * '\'m-1 {3* e zng n,m - -n- - L...k=1 ak - L...k=4 k' 
* - - n m m + k * m n,m n - 2 - m _m_L { ( ) ,X* k-3 ( ) (n-1) } ~m+k- m + k n(n- (m + k)) An,m + nC~~~) f; m + j n- m c~~~) n,m 
if k is even; 
k-4 (n-2) 
* m * n { m( m + k - 1) * m * "" m+j ~m+k = -:;;An,m + n- (m + k) n(n- (m + k- 1)) An,m + -:;;An,m ~ (m:~~1) 
(n-1) } m m . . . 
- n _ m ( n- 1 ) Ln,m if k zs odd, 
m+k-1 
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m A* if n is odd; 
n(n- 1) n,m 
w~_ 1 = 0 if n is even. 
Proof. To find the optimal redistribution scheme, notice that when A= A~,m' we 
have X 1 = (n-m)(n-1)/n. When 2::; k::; m-1, Xk = n-m if k is an odd number 
and Xk = (n- m) (1- ~A~,m) if k is an even number. When m::; k::; n -1, Xk = 0 
if k is an odd number and Xk = -A~,m m(:-k) if k is an even number. Recalling 
Xi = ( M p )i, we can find the optimal redistribution scheme has coefficients. 
The last term is given as 
Pn-2 = - ( m ) A~ m if n is odd and 0 if n is even. 
nn-1 ' 
The first three terms are given as 
Po- P1 = 0 
2A~m(n- m) 
Pl-P2= ~(n- 2) 
-2A* (n- m) n,m 
P2 - P3 = ( n - 3) ( n - 2) . 
We will find the coefficient Pk- Pk+l for all k, 3 ::; k::; m- 2. We have 
(n- m) {n- 2hA* ~ 2h(2h -1)(;.~;) 
P2h = n- 2h n n,m - ~ (2j + 2)(2j + 3) (2nh-=_22) 
~ (n- 2jA~,m)(2h)(2h- 1) (~-:=_;) _ 2h(2h- 1)} 
+ L__; (2 ') 1 ( n-2 ) ( n-2 ) j=l n J · 2h-2 n 2h-2 
for 2 ~ h ~ m2l and 
n- m 2h+ 1 
P 2h+I = n- 2h- 1 - n- 2h- 1 P 2h 
for 2 ~ h ~ m23 . Since we can write 
(n- m) n- 2h>.~,m n 
P2h-1- P2h = · - -P2h 2h n 2h 
for 2 ~ h ~ m2l and 
n-m n 
P2h- P2h+1 = 
-n---2-h---1 + n - 2h - 1 P2h 
for 2 ~ h ~ m;-3 , we conclude that 
(n- m) n- 2h>.~,m 
P2h-1 - P2h = 2h · n 
n (n- m) {n- 2h)..* ~ 2h(2h -1)(;;~;) 
- 2h n- 2h n n,m- j=O (2j + 2)(2j + 3)(2nh-::_22) 
~ (n- 2j>.~,m)(2h)(2h- 1) (;;-::._;) _ 2h(2h- 1)} 
+ ~ (2 ')l(n-2) (n-2) j=l n J · 2h-2 n 2h-2 
for 2 ~ h ~ m2l and 
n-m 
P2h - P2h+1 = - n _ 2h _ 1 
n (n- m) {n- 2h>.* ~ 2h(2h- 1)(;;~;) 
+ n- 2h -1 n- 2h n n,m- j=O (2j + 2)(2j + 3)G~_22) 
~ (n- 2j>.~,m)(2h)(2h- 1)(;;-::._;) _ 2h(2h- 1)} 
+ ~ (2 ')l(n 2) (n-2) j=l n J · 2h-2 n 2h-2 
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for 2 ~ h ~ m23 . From ~";=~2 Pk - Pk+1 = Po - Pm-1 and Po = n-:,_m, we can compute 
Pm-1· 
Now we will find the remaining coefficients Pk- Pk+1 form- 1 ~ k ~ n- 3. We 
have the first four terms as 
n 
Pm-1- Pm = Pm-1 
n-m 
m ,\* nm 
Pm- Pm+1 =-:;;: n,m- (n _ m)(n _ (m + 1))Pm-1 
m * nm(m+ 1) 
Pm+l- Pm+2 =- (n- (m + 2)) An,m + (n- m)(n- (m + 1))(n- (m + 2))Pm-1 
m * m(m+2) * 
Pm+2- Pm+3 =-:;;:An,m + (n _ (m + 3))(n _ (m + 2)) An,m 
nm(m + 1)(m + 2) 
(n- m)(n- (m + 3))(n- (m + 2))(n- (m + 1))Pm-1· 
We can write 
h-2 ( ) ( n ) 
_ m(m + 2h) * m ,\* m + 2j + 2 m+2H2 
Pm+2h- n(n- (m + 2h)) An,m + n n,m :?= m + 2h + 1 ( n ) 
J=O m+2h+1 
( m ) ( m + 1 ) (m:1) 
- n Pm-1 
n - m m + 2h + 1 (m+2h+l) 
for 2 ~ h ~ n-r;-2. With 
n- (m+ 2h) 
Pm+2h-1 = - m + 2h Pm+2h, 
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we have 
n { m(m + 2h) * 
Pm+2h-1- Pm+2h =-m + 2h n(n _ (m + 2h)) An,m 
h-2 ( ( n ) 
+ m .A* """ m + 2j + 2) m+2j+2 
n n,m ~ m + 2h + 1 ( n ) j=O m+2h+1 
( m ) ( m + 1 ) (m:1) } 
- n-m m+2h+1 (m+;h+l)Pm-1 
for 2 ~ h ~ n-;:-2 . With 
m * m+2h+ 1 
Pm+2h+l = ---;;.An,m- n _ (m + 2h + 1)Pm+2h, 
m * n { m(m + 2h) * 
Pm+2h- Pm+2h+1 = --;;-An,m + n _ (m + 2h + 1) n(n _ (m + 2h)) An,m 
+ m .A* ~ (m + 2j + 2) (m+~j+2) 
n n,m ~ m + 2h + 1 ( n ) j=O m+2h+1 
( m ) ( m + 1 ) (m:1) } 
- n-m m+2h+1 (m+;h+l)Pm-1 
for 2 < h < n-m-4 . • 
- - 2 
The following lemma provides optimal redistribution schemes for m = 2, corre-
sponding to Theorem 1.2. 
Lemma 3 The following linear redistribution scheme defines an optimal mecha-
nism form= 2: 
5 n-1 
r~.2 (c-i) = L a'k(c-i)*k + L f3'k(c-i)*k 
k=1 k=6 
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where 
Proof of Theorem 1.1 
When m = 1, ps(c) = (n- 1)c*1 and es(c) = ~ 'L,iEN c;- c*1 . Applying en-k 
with k = 0 and k = n, the no deficit and worst case constraints give p0 = n-1 and n 
Pn-1 = 0. With k = 1, the constraints are -(1 + >.) (n~1 ) ~ (n- 1)p1 ~ - n~ 1 . And 
for k, 2 ~ k ~ n- 1, the constraints give -A n~k ~ kpk_1 + (n- k)pk ~ 0. Setting 
M and p as before, we find the same hyperplane and 
-(n- 1) 2 (~)x1 + (;)x, + ... ~ (~)x, + (~)x. + ... 2 ->. t, (~) (n ~ k) 
even 
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leads to the following inequality: 
n-1 
>. > --;:--. -----,--
- ~k=2 G) (n~k) 
even 
where n is n -1 if n is odd and n is n- 2 if n is even. Therefore, the optimal efficiency 
loss to efficient surplus is given as >.~,I = 2nn_-;~I. 
The optimal redistribution mechanism is as follows: If n = 3, p0 - PI = 1 and 
PI = -~. If n = 4, Po- PI = 1, PI - P2 = -~, and P2 = 0. If n 2: 5, the first three 
terms are given as 
Po- fi = 1 
8 - 8n - 2nn + 4n2 
PI- P2 = ( -4 + 2n) ( -2 + n)n 
2(8 - 2n - 6n + 2n2 ) 
and the last term is given as 
4 
Pn-2 = - ( -4 + 2n) n 
if n is odd and Pn-2 = 0 if n is even. The residual terms are computed as 
1 
for 1 :=:::; h :=:::; n25 · 1 { n:odd} + n24 · 1 { n:even}, and 
4(n- 1) 4 L:~=I (n;!I) 1 
P2h+2 - P2h+3 = - ( _ 2h _ 3) (2n _ 4) - 2n _ 4 ( n-2 ) + ( n-2 ) 
n 2h+2 2h+2 
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for 1 ~ h ~ n25 · 1{n:odd} + n26 · 1{n:even}· • 
Proof of Theorem 1.3 
When m = n -1 and m 2': 2, ps( c) = c*(n-l) and es( c) = - ~ LiEN Ci + c*n. When 
cost profile is en-k, ps(c) = 1 for 0 ~ k ~ n- 2 and ps(c) = 0 for n- 1 ~ k ~ n. 
Likewise, es(c) = 1 - ~(n- k) for 0 ~ k ~ n- 1 and es(c) = 0 for k = n. At each 
profile en-k, the no deficit and worst case constraints give 1-~- ~ ~ ( n -1) p1 ~ 1- ~ 
for k = 1, 1 - >..~ ~ kPk-l + (n- k)pk ~ 1 for 2 ~ k ~ n- 2 and ->..(1 - ~) ~ 
(n- 1)Pn-2 ~ 0 fork= n- 1. Using the same M and p and finding the hyperplane, 
we have 
(n -1- A)+~ (1- A~)(~)~~ (~)x• ~ ~ (~)x• ~ ~ (~) 
odd odd even even 
if n is odd and 
(n-1) + ~ (~) ~ ~ (~)x. ~ ~ (~)x• ~ ~ (~) (1- A~) 
odd odd even even 
if n is even. Then, we have the following inequality: 
when n is odd, and 
"'n-2 (n) _ "'n-3 (n) 
L....k=l k L....k=O k ).. > odd even 
- "'n-2 fs_ (n) 
L....k=l n k 
odd 
z:~=~ (~) - z:~:~ G) ).. > even odd 
- "'n-2 k (n) 
L....k=2 n k 
even 
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when n is even. Then, the optimal efficiency loss to efficient surplus is written as 
'* n-1 • An,n-1 = 2n-2-1 · 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Case 1. m = 1: when deficit is allowed, the two way worst case constraints are 
written as 
Applying en-k, for k = 1, we have 
n-1 n-1 (-1- >.)-- ~ (n -1)p1 ~ (-1 + >.)--
n n 
and for n - 1 2: k 2: 2 
n-k n-k 
->.-n- ~ kPk-1 + (n- k)pk ~ >.-n-. 
Then, we have 
(n -1){-1 +A)+~{; (:){n- k) 2 -~ {; (:)(n- k) 
odd even 
giving 
n-1 
>.> . 
- 2n-1- 1 
\# n-1 R 11" \* _ n-1 )..# _ 2n-2-1 rv 1. Thus, A = 2n-1_1. eca 1ng A - 2n-2_1' )..• - 2n-1_1 - 2. 
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Case 2. n - 1 :;::: m :;::: 2: when deficit is allowed, the two way constraints are 
given as 
Applying en-k, for k = 1, this is written as 
and m - 1 :;::: k :;::: 2, 
(n- m)- A [: (n- k)- (m- k)] ~ kPk-1 + (n- k)pk 
~ (n- m) +A [: (n- k)- (m- k)]. 
For n- 1:;::: k:;::: m, 
If m is odd (if m is even, computation is the same), 
(n _ rn)(n- 1) + >.(n- m) + 'f (~) [(n- m) + >-(:(n- k)- (m- k))] 
k=3 
odd 
+A: :2. (~)(n- k)~ ~ (~) [n-m- >-(:(n- k)- (m- k))] 
odd even 
-A: L (~)(n-k). 
k=m+l 
even 
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This is rearranged as 
and thus, 
)..# = (n- m) (;-=_~) 
( _ ) ""m-2 (n-1) + ""n-1 (n-1) n m L.Jk=O k m L.Jk=m k 
c 1 2 R 11' '* - (n-m)(,';;:::.;) c 2 > > 2 !Of n - ~ m ~ . eca mg A - ( _ ) ""m-2 (n 2) ""n 2 (n 2) !Of n - _ m _ , 
n m L..Jk=O k +m L..Jk=m k 
we write 
for n- 2 ~ m ~ 2. Form= n- 1, 
)..# 2n-2 - 1 1 
A* - 2n-1 - 1 ~ 2. • 
Proof of Proposition 2 
We will apply cost profile en-k for k, 0 :::; k :::; n. Recall for 0 :::; k :::; m - 1, 
es(c) = ~(n- m) with ps(c) = n- m and for m :::; k :::; n, es(c) = ~(n- k) with 
ps(c) = 0. 
v; < !!!c. with anonymity requires n-mc*m < r(c*1 · · · c*(m-1) c*(m+1) . . . em) 
t_ n t n - ' ' ' ' ' . 
This is written as 
(Po - PI)c*1 + · · · + (Pm-2 - Pm-l)c*(m-l) - n - m c*m 
n 
+ (Pm-1 - Pm)c*(m+l) + · · · + Pn-2c*n ~ 0. 
115 
This inequality holds if and only if Pk ~ 0 for all k, m:::; k:::; n- 2 and Pk ~ n~m for 
all k, 0 :::; k :::; m - 1. The non-deficit constraint implies 
(n- m)c*m ~ (n- 1)(po- pr)c*1 + [(po- PI)+ (n- 2)(PI - P2)]c*2 
+ · · · + [(m- 1)(Pm-2- Pm-d + (n- m)(Pm-1- Pm)]c*m + · · · 
+ [(n- 2)(Pn-3- Pn-2) + Pn-2]c*(n-l) + (n- 1)Pn-2c*n 
and by Lemma 1, this holds if and only if Pn-2 :::; 0, (n - 2)Pn-3 + 2Pn-2 :::; 0, 
· · · , ffiPm-1 + (n- m)pm :::; 0, (m- 1)Pm-2 + (n- m + 1)Pm-1 :::; n- m, · · · , 
p0 + (n- 1)p1 :::; n- m and np0 :::; n- m. With unanimity upper bound, this implies 
Pn-2 = · · · = Pm = 0. Since Pm = 0, the non-deficit constraint gives mpm-1 :::; 0 but 
this contradicts Pm-1 ~ n:m given by unanimity upper bound. Therefore, there is no 
anonymous linear VCG mechanism satisfying unanimity upper bound and non-deficit . 
• 
Proof of Theorem 2.1 
We know that the pivotal mechanism is anonymous and individually rational. 
It generates no deficit, that is, J.-l~. 1 = 0, but its efficiency loss is .A~. 1 = oo. If .A is 
restricted to be finite, we have that for k = 0, es(c) = 0 and ps(c) = n- 1, so the 
worst case constraint implies p0 = n~ 1 . For k = n, the worst case constraint implies 
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Pn-1 = 0. For k, 1 :::; k :::; n- 1, the worst case constraint gives 
1 1 
->.-(n- k) :::; kPk-1 + (n- k)pk :::; J.L-(n- k) 
n n 
and individual rationality implies r( c_i) 2': 0, which is Pk 2': 0 for all 0 :::; k :::; n - 1. 
The worst case and individual rationality constraints are together written as 
1 0:::; kpk-1 + (n- k)pk :::; J.L-(n- k) 
n 
for 1 :::; k :::; n - 1. For X in the range of M, we have 
and for 2 :::; k :::; n - 1 
n-1 o:::; x1 :::; --(J.L- 1) 
n 
m 
0 :::; xk :::; J.L-(n- k). 
n 
Note that from 0 :::; X 1 :::; n-;: 1 (J.L- 1), we should have 1-L 2': 1. Let J.L = 1. Set Pk = 0 
for all k, 1 :::; k :::; n- 2, then the inequality constraints are satisfied. With p0 = n-;: 1 , 
we can set r(c-i) = n-;:1 (c-i)*1 and compute the efficiency loss of this redistribution 
scheme. D.( c)= n-;: 1 (c*1 - c*2) and es(c) = L;;~Nc; - c*1. 
Therefore, the optimal J.L = 1 with ), = 0, and the optimal redistribution scheme is 
r( c_i) = n-;:1 ( c_i)*1. • 
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Proof of Theorem 2.2 
We found Po = n~2 and Pn-1 = 0. 
{ n-2 } n-2 max 0, -n-(n- 1- >.) :s; xl :s; -n-(n- 1 + J-t). 
For 2 :s; k :s; n- 1, 0 :s; Xk :s; J-t~(n- k). Suppose n- 1 2:: ..\. Then, we have 
(n- 2){n- I->.) ~ (~)x1 + t, (~)x. ~ t, (~)x• ~I'~ t, (~) (n- k) 
odd even even 
and 
n-3 ( ) (n- 2)(n- 1) = (n- 2)..\~,2 + 2 £; n: 2 J-t~.2 • 
The maximal >.~.2 = n- 1, so >.~.2 satisfies ,\ :s; n- 1. 
R 11 B( 2) (n-l)(n-2) D > 5 h eca n, = 2n 1 _ 2 . ror n _ , we ave 
n- 2 [ n- 1 n- 3 ] (n- 2)[(n- 5)2n-3 + 2] 
B(n, 2)- B(n- 1, 2) = -2- 2n-2- 1 - 2n-3- 1 = - 2(2n-2- 1)(2n-3- 1) < 0, 
so B(n, 2) is strictly decreasing inn. B(4, 2) = n:l gives the result. • 
We provide the optimal redistribution schemes corresponding to Theorem 2.2 in 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 4 For any J-l~.2 > 0 chosen, the optimal redistribution scheme is as 
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follows: 
6 n-1 
r*(c-i) = L ak(c-i)*k + L f3k:(c-i)*k 
k=l k=7 
where 
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Proof. If >.~ 2 = 0, then 
' 
* (n- 2)(n- 1) (n;l) 
1-tn,2 = 2 ""'n-3 (n-2) = 2n-2 _ 1 · 
L..,k=O k 
From X1 = n~2 (n- 1), P1 = n~2 . Xk = 0 for k odd, 3 ::; k ::; n and Xk = 
~(n- k) 2~~~J1 for k even, 2 ::; k ::; n. We have Po = P1 = n~2 and Pn-l = 0. Recall 
that >.~,2 and f-£~,2 satisfy 
n-1 n-2 ( ) n-3 ( ) 2 2 = (n- 2)>.~,2 + 2 ~ k J-£~,2 . 
and for k odd, n 2: k 2: 3, 
Therefore, ai = p0 - p1 = 0 and a2 = P1 - P2 = 1 - 2!:. For k 2: 3, we have 
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if k is odd and 
if k is even. 
Given any J.-L~ 2 , 0 < J.-L~ 2 :::; BC((n,m)), we can find the corresponding redistribution 
, , n,m 
scheme. Let T = JL';. 2 B(n,m)-C(n,m). Now X1 = (n-1)(n-2) (1 + T) instead of X1 = 
A(n,m)(n-1) n 
(n- 1~n-2) for the J.-L~, 2 = L case. For k odd, k ~ 3, still we have Xk = 0 and for k 
even, k ~ 2, we have Xk = J.-L*~(n- k) instead of L~(n- k) for the J.-L~,2 = L case. 
Then, P1 = n~2 [1 + T] with Po = n~2 . For k even, 2 :::; k :::; n, 
and for k odd, n ~ k ~ 3, 
k { 2£ 2£ "'k-3 (n- 2) 2(n-1) L- 1- T} L....,l=3 l 2 
Pk = --=-k - · 1{k~5} +- (n-1) · 1{k~7} + (n-1) · 
n n n k-1 k-1 n 
Therefore, a1 =Po- P1 =- n~2T and a2 = P1- P2 = 1 + T- 2;. Fork~ 3, we have 
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if k is odd and 
(n-1) 
if k is even. From L = 2n_22_ 1 , we have 
and 
Plugging the functional forms of L, T and L- 1- Tin nand minto ak's, we have 
the coefficient a'k for 3 ::; k ::; n - 1 as follows: 
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if k is odd and 
.f k . h 0 * (n2l) • 
1 IS even w ere < /Jn,2 ::; 2n-2_1 · 
Proof of Theorem 2.3 
Let ii = n - 1 and n = n - 2 if n is even and ii = n - 2 and n = n - 1 if n is odd. 
Firstly, we will show for any m, 3 ::; m::; n- 2 in Case 1 and 2: 
Case 1. m is odd: 
Again Po = n~m and Pn-l = 0. For 1 ::; k ::; n- 1, individual rationality and the 
worst case constraint require 
and for m - 1 2:: k 2:: 2 
and for n- 1 2:: k 2:: m, 
m 0::; xk::; ~J-(n- k). 
n 
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If A~ m~l, then, max { 0, (n- m) ( 1- ~)} = (n- m) ( 1- ~) and max { 0, (n-
m) ( 1- ~- ~)} = (n- m) ( 1- ~- ~). 
We have 
en - m) en + I" - I) + en - m) ~ ( ~) ( 1+1"~) + '!;;, ( ~) f": en - k) 
odd odd 
2 ~ (~)x. + 'J;;, (~)x. = ~ (~)x. + .~1 (~)x. 
odd odd even even 
m-1 ( ) { Ak} ~ ( n - m) ~ ~ max 0, 1 - -;;;: . 
even 
Assuming that A~ m~l, we have 
+n- m) ~ (~)~] + +n -m) ~(~)~+'!;;,(~)en- k):] 
even odd odd 
2 en-m){~ (~)-~ (~)} 
even odd 
and thus, 
A~,m [en- m) ~ (~) ~] + l":,m [en- m) ~ (~)~+'!;;,(~)en- k):] 
== ~d ~d 
= en-m){~ (~)-~ (~)} 
even odd 
This is rewritten as 
l"~,m[(n-m)~ (n~ 2) +m[k~l (n~1) _ }~, (n~2)]] 
+ ~.m[(n- m) ~ (n ~ 2)] = (n -m)(:~ D 
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Now we will check if .X~,m satisfies the assumption A ::; m~l. Let f-L~,m = 8-X~,m 
for some 8;::: 0. Then, 
A~,m ::; m~l holds if and only if 
(n- m)(m-1){~ (~)-~ (~)} 
even odd 
S n{(n- m){~ (~)~ + ~o(~)~} +8~ (~)(n- k): }· 
even odd odd 
Since (~) k = n G:::~) and _G) ( n - k) = n (n~l), the right hand side of the previous 
inequality is written as 
n{ (n- m){ ~ (~)~ + ~o(~)~} +8~ (~)(n- k):} 
even odd odd 
= (n-ml{n ~ (~=~)+nO~(~= D} +nm6~ (n ~ 1). 
even odd odd 
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Thus, A~,m ::; m~l if and only if 
(n- rn){(m-1)(~ (~)-~ (~)) -n ~ (~= ~)} 
even odd even 
:; 8{ n(n- m) ~ (~ = ~) + mn ~ (n ~I)} 
odd odd 
The right hand side of the inequality is nonnegative. We will show that the left hand 
side is always negative and thus, the inequality holds. Let 
A(n) ~ (m-1)(~ (~)-~ (~)) -n ~ G= ~) 
even odd even 
Observe that A(n) < 0 if m = 3. Form;::: 5, we check first 
A(m+l) ~ (m-1)(~ (m:l)-~ (m:l)) -(m+l) ~ v: 1) 
== ~d == 
~ (m -l)m- (m + 1) ~ (k: 1) :; (m- l)m- m(m +I)< 0 
k=2 
even 
and show that A( n) is decreasing in n. 
A(n)-A(n+IHm-1)(~(~)- ~(~)) -n~(~=D 
even odd even 
_ (m _I)(~ (n; I) _ ~ (n; I)) + (n +I)~ (k: J 
even odd even 
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have 
A(n)- A(n + 1) ~(m- 1) [~ C: 1) -%: (k: 1)] +%: k(k: 1). 
odd even even 
Finally, we write 
A(n)- A(n + 1) ~(m- 1) [~ (k: 1) -~ (k: 1)] + ~ k(k: 1) 
odd even even 
~(m-1)[~ (~)-~ (~)] + ~k(k: 1) > 0 
even odd even 
and thus, A( n) is decreasing in n. We conclude that A( n) < 0, that is, the desired 
inequality holds for ).~ m. 
' 
Case 2. m is even: 
We have 
max{o,n(n-m)(1-~-~) }+%: (~)max{o,(n-m)(1- ~)} 
odd 
~ ~ (~)x. + .~1 G)x. ~ ~ (~)x. + i;,. (~)x. 
odd odd even even 
~ (n-m) ~ (~) (1+ I'~)+ I' t.. (~) :(n- k) 
even even 
Given m, the optimal surplus loss ). * can be considered as a function of n. We 
should find k such that k = max{k, 3::::; k::::; m -l,oddl ~ ~ .A*(n) for all n}. Here 
.A*(n) is the optimal surplus loss computed with assuming n/k ~.A*. 
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Assuming njk ~A, we have 
max { 0, ( n - m) ( 1 - A:) } = ( n _ m) ( 1 _ A:) 
only for 3 ::=:; k ::=:; k. Then, 
(n- m)(n- A- 1) + (n- m) t, (~) ( 1- ~) 
odd 
~ ~ (~)x• + ,1;1 (~)x. = ~ (~)x, + ~ (~)x, 
odd odd even even 
even even 
g1ves 
A[(n- m) t (~)~] + +n- m) ~ (~)~ +: ~ (~)(n- k)l 
odd even even 
<: (n- m) [ t (~) -~ (~) l 
odd even 
and thus, 
A;,.m [ ( n - m) t, ( ~) ~] + l'~.m [ ( n - m) ~ ( ~) ~ + : ~ ( ~} n - k)] 
odd even even 
=(n-m)[t,(~)-~ (~)] 
odd even 
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Let M~,m = 8>.~,m for some 8 2:: 0. Then, the optimal surplus loss computed with 
assuming n / k 2:: >.~,m is 
(n- m) [2:L1 G)- 2:7::~ (~)J 
\* odd even 
Anm = [ 
' (n- m) L:L1 (~) ~ + 8 2:~,:-i (~) ~J + 7:8 l:~=m G) (n- k) 
odd even even 
and this >.~,m should not contradict the assumption, that is, 
(n- m) [ 2:~=1 (~) - 2:~,:-~ (~)J 
~ > odd even 
k - (n- m) [ 2:~=1 (~) ~ + 8 2:~,:-i G) ~J + 7:8 l:~=m G) (n- k) 
odd even even 
for 3 :=::; k :=::; m - 1. This inequality is equivalent to 
o[~ G)k+ n ~m ~(~)en- k)]z k[t, (~)-%: (~) ]-t, G)k 
even even odd even odd 
Since the left hand side of the inequality is always nonnegative for any n, n 2:: m + 1, 
we like to have the right hand side negative for any n, n 2:: m + 1. Our objective is 
to find maximal k, 3 :=::; k ::; m - 1 satisfying 
k[t, (~)-%: (~) ]-t, (~)k ~ 0. (3.3) 
odd even odd 
Let k = m- 1. Then, inequality (3.3) is 
~ (~)kz (m-1)[~ (~)-%: (~)] 
odd odd even 
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This is rewritten as 
~ (~) (m- 1- k)- (m- 1) ~ (~) ,; 0 
odd even 
Let S(n) = Ek~3 (~)(m- 1- k)- (m -1) E7:::5 (~).Firstly observe that 
odd even 
S ( m + 1) = 1 + m 2 - 2m- I ( m + 1) < 0 
for m, m ~ 4. We can show that S(n) is decreasing in n for n ~ m + 1. Using 
(~) - (nkl) = - (k:l), we write 
S(n)- S(n + 1) = -(m- 1) ~(-l)k-l C: 1) + k ~ (k: 1) 
odd 
= -(m -1) ~(-1)•(~) + k ~ (k: 1). 
odd 
S(n)- S(n + 1) = (m -1)(-w-'(: ::_ ~) + k ~ (k: 1) · 
odd 
Since m is even, we have S(n) - S(n + 1) > 0 implying that S(n) is decreasing in 
n given m. Therefore, we conclude S(n) < 0 for all n, n ~ m + 1 as desired. That 
is, k = m - 1 works without contradiction and the optimal efficiency loss must be 
computed with k = m - 1. 
Plugging k = m- 1, we have 
l'~,m [<n- m) ~ (n ~ 2) + m[.tl (n ~I)- .f2 (n ~ 2) ]] 
+A~.m[{n- m) ~ (n ~ 2)] = (n- m)(:~ D· 
Now we will show the statement for the case of m = n- 1 form 2: 3: 
The two way worst case constraints are written as 
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[n - 1 1 n-1 ] [n - 1 1 n-1 ] c*(n-1) - ..\ -n-c*n- -:;;, ?= c*i :::; ?= r(c-i) :::; c*(n-1) + J.L -n-c*n--:;;, ?= c*i . 
z=1 zEN t=1 
Applying en-k with individual rationality, we have p0 = ~ and Pn-I = 0. Fork= 1, 
n-1-..\ n-1+J.L 
max{O, } :::; (n -1)p1 :::; ---
n n 
and for n- 2 2: k 2: 2, 
k k 
max{O, 1- -..\} :::; kPk-1 + (n- k)pk :::; 1 + -J.L. 
n n 
For k = n - 1, we have 
n-1 
0 :::; (n- 1)Pn-2 :::; J.L--. 
n 
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If n is odd and n".:_ 2 2:: A, 
(n- 1- A)+ I:(~) (1- ~A) ~I: (n) (1 + ~J.L) + J.L(n- 1) 
k=3 n k=2 k n 
odd even 
which is equivalent to 
(n- 1) ~ A(2n-2- 1) +fL. 2n-2. 
Thus, the optimal frontier is 
(n- 1) = A*(2n-2 - 1) + J.L* · 2n-2. 
We can easily check that the maximal A* on the optimal frontier satisfies A* ~ n".:_2 . 
Likewise, if n is even and A ~ n".:... 2 , 
(n-1+ !') + ~ (~) (1+ ~I')+ (n: 1)1'n: 1 2 ~ (~) (1- ~A) 
odd even 
From this, we have 
and the optimal frontier is 
A*(2n-2- 1) + J.L*2n-2 = n- 1. 
The maximal A* on the optimal frontier doesn't contradict A ~ n".:...2 • • 
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